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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the current non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in goods in the East 
African Community (EAC). It identifies inefficiencies and delays at port and customs, as 
well as transport delays, multiple transit fees, customs documentation, restricted axle load 
limits and too many weigh bridges and police road blocks, import and export inspection 
and certification procedures, arbitrary use of rules of origin and interpretation of standards 
and SPS requirements, and infrastructure constraints as major obstacles to integration of 
the East African community. They elevate the cost of trading across borders, and severely 
impair export competitiveness of the trading partners especially the landlocked EAC 
members. The other key non-tariff barriers highlighted in the paper are congestion of trucks 
at the port, bribery and corruption, business registration and licensing procedures, import 
and export bans various national documents and inland terminal or transit parking yards 
procedures and facilities, and poor flow or dissemination of policy information.   
 
JEL Classification: D78, F10, F13, F14, F15. 
 
Key words: Non tariff barriers, Trade Policies, intra-EAC trade, EAC trade corridors, East Africa 
Community. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The need to facilitate free movement of goods, services, and capital and to support the 
better integration of developing and least-developed countries (LDCs) into the global 
economy has been one of the main forces driving multilateral trade negotiations and 
policies over the last two decades. Traders from both developed and developing countries 
have long pointed to the vast amount of “red tape” that still exists in moving goods and 
capital across borders (WTO, 2008). Documentation requirements often lack transparency 
and are vastly duplicated in many places, involving multiple agencies in some cases, a 
problem often compounded by a lack of infrastructure. Despite advances in information 
technology, automatic data submission is still not commonplace. This working paper 
documents the existing non-tariff barriers on goods trade in East Africa. 
The EAC is a regional bloc, made up of six partner states:  Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda and South Sudan. Article 5(2) of the Treaty for the Establishment of 
the East African Community sets out a vision for the eventual unification of the partner 
states–beginning with the establishment of a customs union; followed by a common 
market, a monetary union, and eventually, a political federation (EAC, 2002). The first 
step in this process is underway, with the Protocol for the Establishment of the East 
African Community (EAC) Customs Union, signed in March 2004, coming into effect 
on 1 January 2005 for the three founding Partner States (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), 
establishing a common external tariff (CET) and set to remove all intra-EAC tariffs over a 
five-year transition period. The two new Partner States, Burundi and Rwanda, adopted 
the protocol in July 2007. Thus far, internal tariffs between the EAC countries have largely 
been eliminated. 1  
                                                 
1 With exception of category B goods: exports from Kenya to Uganda for 443 items, and for exports from 
Kenya to Tanzania for 880 items, which are to be phased out by 2010. The asymmetry in liberalizing 
intra-regional trade is intended to give Uganda and Tanzania, which have less developed industrial 
sectors and large trade deficits with Kenya, additional time for structural adjustments. The 443 products 
on Uganda’s list are subject to import tariffs of 10 per cent that will be reduced to zero in five annual 
steps (starting with 10 percent in 2005; to 8 percent in 2006; 6 percent in 2007; 4 percent in 2008; 2 
percent in 2009; and finally 0 percent in 2010).  Trade between Tanzania and Uganda, as well as exports 
from Tanzania and Uganda to Kenya; have been duty free since 1 January 2005. Exports from Kenya to 
Tanzania and Uganda are divided into Category A and Category B goods. The Category “A” goods have 
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The integration of EAC will create a large market of a population of approximately 120 
million people (Table A2) and a combined GDP of US$300 billion. However, the existence 
of large non-tariff barriers may make this hope elusive. Indeed, one of the factors cited for 
inhibiting trade in the EAC has been the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) maintained by partner 
states after signing of EAC Treaty and the Customs Protocol. Many commentators argue 
that the success of EAC integration can be fully realized if trading partners can eliminate 
existing non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, and control for trade costs.  
For developing-country economies (such as the EAC), inefficiencies in areas such as 
customs, port and transport, import and export inspection and certification procedures, 
arbitrary use of rules of origin, arbitrary interpretation of standards and SPS requirements, 
and infrastructure constraints can be roadblocks to their integration into the global 
economy and may severely impair export competitiveness or inflow of foreign direct 
investment. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
estimates that the average customs transaction involves 20–30 different parties, 
40 documents, 200 data elements, 30 of which are repeated at least 30 times, and the re-
keying of 60 to70 per cent of all data at least once.  
With the lowering of tariffs across the globe, the cost of complying with customs 
formalities and other non-tariff barriers has been reported to exceed in many instances the 
cost of duties to be paid. In the changing global business environment, traders need fast and 
predictable release and movement of goods.  
 
WTO provisions 
As members of the WTO, the EAC agreements are expected to be in conformity to WTO 
rules. The WTO rules include a variety of provisions that aim to enhance transparency and 
set minimum procedural standards. Among them are Article 5 (which deals with Freedom 
of Transit of transit for goods), Article 8 (Fees and Formalities connected with Importation 
and Exportation) and Article 10 (on Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations) 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), aimed at expediting the 
                                                                                                                       
been treated duty free. Internal tariffs on the Category “B” goods (880 tariff lines at six-digit level in the case 
of Tanzania, and 443 lines in the case of Uganda) are to be phased out in five years, as mentioned. 
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movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. The WTO agreement 
on customs valuation aims for a fair, uniform and neutral system for the valuation of goods 
for customs purposes—as opposed to the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. 
Customs administrations have the right to request further information in cases where they 
have reason to doubt the accuracy of the declared value of imported goods.  
The obligations placed on governments which use pre-shipment inspections include non-
discrimination, transparency, protection of confidential business information, avoiding 
unreasonable delay, the use of specific guidelines for conducting price verification and 
avoiding conflicts of interest by the inspection agencies. 
The Rules of Origin Agreement requires WTO members to ensure that their rules of 
origin are transparent; that they do not have restricting, distorting or disruptive effects on 
international trade; that they are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner; and that they are based on a positive standard (in other words, they 
should state what does confer origin rather than what does not). 
The WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures requires import licensing to be 
simple, transparent and predictable. For example, the agreement requires governments to 
publish sufficient information for traders to know how and why the licences are granted. It 
also describes how countries should notify the WTO when they introduce new import 
licensing procedures or change existing procedures. The agreement offers guidance on how 
governments should assess applications for licences. 
In Paragraph 27 of the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Members “recognize 
the case for further expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including 
goods in transit, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity building in this 
area…” However, the WTO legal framework lacks specific provisions in some areas, 
particularly on customs procedures and documentation, and on transparency. The 
spectacular increase in the amount of goods traded worldwide in the last few years and the 
advances in technology and the computerization of business transactions have added a sense 
of urgency to the need to make the rules more uniform, user-friendly and efficient.   
The primary goal of WTO Trade Facilitation negotiations launched in August 2004 is to 
reduce the transaction cost and complexity of international trade for business and improve 
the trading environment in a country, while at the same time optimising efficient and 
effective levels of government controls. It includes, the reform and standardization of 
physical infrastructure and transport facilities (such as ports, customs points and various 
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agencies involved in facilitating trade), improving transparency and efficiency (in the 
clearance and release of goods), especially at the border, and the application of international 
standards in order to simplify and harmonize customs procedures, documents and 
formalities. 
Annex D of the 1 August 2004 decision (‘the July Framework’) contains the framework 
for work on trade facilitation. Annex D provides, for negotiations which aim to “clarify and 
improve relevant aspects of Articles V (on transit), VIII (on fees and formalities) and X (on 
publication and appeal) of the GATT 1994 with a view to further expediting the movement, 
release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit”. 
To reiterate the subject matter of the 3 GATT Articles: Article V provides general 
principles permitting freedom of transit through another Member’s territory (without 
unnecessary delays and exempt from customs duties). Article VIII contains 3 provisions 
that are relevant for the negotiations: (i) fees and charges in connection with import and 
export (for example, additional customs fees beyond a tariff duty) must be commensurate 
with the cost of providing the service; (ii) the number and complexity of import and export 
formalities must be minimized; and (iii) import and export documentation requirements 
should be simplified and kept at a minimum. Although Article VIII does not provide any 
mandatory requirements in this area, some Members have suggested that international 
standards should be applied in order to make border-related documentation and procedures 
more straightforward.  
There are two relevant provisions in Article X requiring that: (i) laws, regulations and 
other information (including on cross-border procedures and customs administration) that 
affect or relate to importing and exporting must be published promptly in such a manner as 
to enable governments and traders to familiarize themselves with them; and (ii) laws 
relating to trade must be administered in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, with 
provision made for judicial or quasi-judicial review of administrative decisions.   
 
EAC provisions on NTB 
 
Article 13 of Protocol on the Establishment of the EAC Customs Union states that “except 
as may be provided for or permitted by this Protocol, each of the Partner States agrees to 
remove, with immediate effect, all the existing non-tariff barriers to the importation into 
their respective territories of goods originating in the other Partner States and, thereafter, 
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not to impose any new non-tariff barriers. The Partner States shall formulate a mechanism 
for identifying and monitoring the removal of non-tariff barriers” (EAC, 1999). 
 
Using various sources (including face to face interviews with private sector organisations), 
traders, production associations and the government bodies, and Government officials and 
key stakeholders in the transport sector; and available documents), the paper: 
 
(i) Documents a list of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in goods – export, import, 
and re-import; 
(ii) suggests which of these NTBs are the critical and constrain intra-EAC trade;  
(iii) for each of the critical NTBs, it presents and analyzes the political economy of its 
existence – the way it functions, the institutional support or acceptance, the 
impact on private sector in terms of higher cost and/or transit time of goods, and 
the solutions the private sector has found to cope; and  
(iv) suggests way(s) in which the NTBs could be eliminated.  
 
For the purpose of the study we use a broad definition of non-tariff barriers that is in line 
with the interpretation provided in the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Community Customs Union, and includes “laws, regulations, administrative and technical 
requirements other than tariffs imposed by a Partner State whose effect is to impede trade”. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section provides a brief profile 
of Uganda’s trade. The third section delves on the major transit routes and the constraints 
along these routes. Section four gives an account of other non-tariff barriers to trade, 
followed by discussion of efforts and challenges to eliminate them (NTBs) in section five, 
and section six concludes.  
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 2 Trade patterns inside the EAC  
 
2.1 EAC in world trade    
Since 1990, absolute improvements have been noted in overall trade performance for EAC 
countries, stimulated by increased openness of their economies.2 EAC exports grew by 4.4 
percent against 4.5 percent growth in imports, between 1990 and 2004 (Table 1). However, 
its share in world trade (exports and imports) has declined between 1990-92 and 2002-2004 
(Table 1). Uganda’s share in world exports increased from 0.006 percent to 0.007 percent, 
between 1990-92 and 2002-2004. Uganda’s share in world exports lags behind Kenya’s 
(0.035 percent) and Tanzania’s (0.014 percent). Uganda also increased its share in world 
imports from 0.012 percent in 1990-92 to 0.016 percent in 2002-2004. 
 
Table 1. Comparative trade performance among EAC countries  
  
 Growth rates (1990-2004), % Share in world exports (%) 
Share in world imports 
(%) 
 Exports Imports GDP 1990-92 2002-2004 1990-92 2002-04 
EAC 4.4 4.5 3.5 0.066 0.059 0.110 0.109 
Kenya 2.8 5.5 1.7 0.04 0.035 0.054 0.056 
Tanzania 5.9 2.3 4.0 0.013 0.014 0.023 0.030 
Uganda 10.9 6.5 6.5 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.016 
Burundi 11.7 6.9 -0.4 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 
Rwanda -0.1 5.4 1.6 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 
COMESA 4.4 2.8 3.4 0.549 0.472 0.699 0.634 
Developing countries 8.4 7.0 3.9 18.45 31.05 18.68 28.28 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE (adopted from World Bank, 2007) 
 
 
2.2 Participation in EAC trade    
Overall, the EAC members have a similar trade pattern, with commodity exports focused on 
extra-EAC markets, especially the EU. An average of 3 to 10 percent of the exports of the 
EAC members have gone to African markets outside the EAC, and 31 to 82 percent to 
                                                 
2 However, measured in relation to country’s GDP, all the countries experienced decline in the export-to-GDP ratio - 
which shows the volume of exports has not expanded in proportion with economic growth in the EAC countries. The 
low export-to-GDP ratios for all the EAC countries are associated with inward-oriented strategies still applied by these 
countries, among other factors.  
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markets outside Africa. An average of 9 to 14 percent of the imports of members has been 
received from Africa outside EAC, while imports from the rest of the world ranged from 50 
to 80 percent.  
Detailed results of intra – and extra – EAC trade are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 
shows overall improvements in intra-EAC exports performance since the 2005, most likely 
attributable to increased openness of the EAC economies. Over the 2000–2004 period, 
Uganda accounted for 5 percent of intra-EAC exports, and a huge 57.5 percent of intra-EAC 
imports. In 2005–2008, Uganda’s share of intra-EAC export rose substantially to 15.3 
percent, while its share of intra-EAC imports declined to 44.4 percent. This means that 
Uganda’s trade performance improved since the launch of the EAC Customs Union in 2005. 
The same applies to Tanzania and Burundi.  
For the case of Tanzania, its share of total intra-EAC exports rose from 8.56 percent in 
2004–2004 (i.e. before the Customs Union) to 14 percent in 2005–2008 (after the Customs 
Union). Its share of total intra-EAC imports declined from 19.25 percent before the Customs 
Union to 14.8 percent after the Customs Union. 
  
Table 2. Intra-EAC trade flows (percent) 
IMPORTING 
COUNTRIES 
EXPORTING COUNTRIES  
Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda TOTAL 
Trade flows 2000 - 2004 averages  
Burundi  2.70 0.12 2.71 0.71 6.25 
Kenya 0.01  0.02 2.49 1.58 4.10 
Rwanda 0.12 9.25  1.67 1.86 12.91 
Tanzania 0.02 18.17 0.04  1.02 19.25 
Uganda 0.01 55.69 0.12 1.68  59.49 
Total 0.15 85.81 0.31 8.56 5.18 100.00 
 Trade flows 2005 - 2008 averages  
Burundi  2.67 0.16 0.97 2.17 5.97 
Kenya 0.18  0.13 6.67 4.24 11.23 
Rwanda 0.46 11.40  3.35 8.33 23.53 
Tanzania 0.01 14.29 0.01  0.53 14.83 
Uganda 0.04 41.18 0.12 3.10  44.44 
Total 0.69 69.54 0.42 14.09 15.26 100.00 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
Burundi saw a slight decline in its share of intra-EAC imports from 6.3 percent in 2000–2004 
to 5.97 percent in 2005 – 2008 and a rise in its share of total intra-EAC exports from 0.15 
percent in 2000–2004 to 0.7 percent in 2005–2008. Rwanda and Kenya’s export-import 
status worsened in 2005–2008. However, Kenya dominates intra-EAC trade, with exports 
and imports share of 86 percent and 4 percent, respectively in 2000–2004 and intra-EAC 
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exports and imports share of 70 percent and 11 percent, respectively in 2005–2008. Kenya’s 
dominance in intra-EAC trade is reflected in its huge trade surplus with all the EAC 
countries. When trade volumes are compared, Uganda accounts for the largest volume of 
imports from EAC and COMESA, while Kenya’s and Tanzania’s volume of imports from 
SADC countries ranks first to those from EAC or COMESA countries. 
Moreover, total imports from EAC, SADC and rest of COMESA to the EAC Partner 
States, collectively accounted for only 18 percent of total imports in the Partner States in 
2005 – 2008, a slight fall from 21 percent in 2000 – 2004 (Table 3).   
   
Table 3. Imports from EAC, rest of COMESA and SADC as a share of total imports 
 
  Percentage of total imports from Percentage of total Imports from 
  EAC Rest of COMESA SADC TOTAL EAC Rest of COMESA SADC TOTAL 
 (2000 – 2004  average) (2005  - 2008 average)  
Burundi 25.8 6.3 8.6 40.7 19.3 4.3 5.4 29.1 
Kenya 1.0 3.3 10.3 14.4 1.5 3.1 7.9 12.5 
Rwanda 29.4 2.2 5.9 37.5 38.7 3.4 6.6 48.7 
Tanzania 5.5 1.8 12.9 20.2 3.8 1.8 12.8 18.4 
Uganda 27.0 1.6 8.8 37.4 16.3 1.9 7.5 25.6 
Total 8.0 2.6 10.6 21.2 6.6 2.6 9.0 18.2 
Source: COMTRADE 
Note: Rest of COMESA excludes COMESA Member States that belong to EAC (i.e. Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda). SADC 
excludes imports from Tanzania    
 
 
2.2.1 Kenya’s trade with the EAC   
 
As we saw in Table 1, Kenya dominates intra-EAC trade, with its exports accounting for as 
high as 86 percent of the total intra–EAC exports.  Yet, its imports from EAC countries 
accounts for only 4 percent of the total intra-EAC imports. As a result, Kenya runs a huge 
trade surplus with all the EAC countries. Kenya has a stronger manufacturing base than any 
of its EAC partners, resulting in a higher capacity to export to the region. 
Figure 1 shows that the European Union is Kenya’s leading destination market and that 
Kenya’s exports to the EAC and COMESA have been increasing but at a relatively slower 
pace than its exports to the EU especially after 2005. Kenya’s exports to EAC as a percent of 
its total exports declined from 23.4 percent in 2005 to 16.6 percent in 2008.  Kenyan exports 
to COMESA followed similar trends.  The share of Kenyan exports to the EU increased 
slightly from 34.7 percent in 2005 to 35.6 in 2008 (it was 43.6 percent in 1998, and 57.7 
percent in 2004).   
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Figure 1. Kenya's exports to selected regional destinations 
 
Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
  
 
In the EAC, Kenya’s merchandise exports are primarily oriented towards Uganda (followed 
by Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi). Its major extra-EAC destinations are the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands. Petroleum products dominate Kenya’s 
exports to the EAC, constituting an average of 39 percent of total exports to Uganda between 
1998 and 2007, 18 percent of total exports to Tanzania, 52 percent to Rwanda, and 46 percent 
to Burundi during the same period. Other major Kenyan exports to the region include 
construction materials, particularly, cement and lime, as well as plastics articles, paper and 
paperboard, iron and steel products, medicaments, soap, cleansing and polishing products, 
vegetable fats and oils, footwear, and textile materials. 
Trends in Kenya’s merchandise imports from 2001 to 2008, presented in Figure 2 put 
European Union on top of all the regions that import into Kenya. One year after signing of 
the EPA Interim Agreement, imports from the EU increased dramatically. Under this 
agreement, Kenya with its EAC partners has agreed to gradually liberalise 80 percent of its 
trade for imports from EU covering mainly capital goods, raw material and intermediate / 
industrial goods over a period of 15 years (attaining full liberalization over a period of 25 
years). Large proportion of Kenya’s imports comprise capital goods and 
intermediate/industrial goods, and manufactured products such as machinery, transportation 
equipment, motor vehicles, and petroleum products.  
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Besides EU, a large bulk of imports comes from the United Arab Emirates, India, China, and 
Saudi Arabia. In the neighbourhood, clearly, the EAC region is not a significant source of 
Kenya’s imports (Figure 2). Imports from EAC accounted for 1.4 percent of the total imports 
in 2008.  
From an insignificant share of 0.35 percent of total imports in 1998 and 2001, imports 
from EAC countries have grown to 1.4 percent in 2008. In value terms, Kenya’s imports 
from EAC partners grew from US$ 13.874 million in 2001 to US$ 182.4 million in 2008. 
Imports from COMESA countries increased from 1.28 percent of total imports in 1998 to 3.5 
percent in 2001, and 3.2 percent in 2008. Most of the imports originating from EAC actually 
come from Tanzania, followed by Uganda, with minute amounts from Rwanda and Burundi 
(accounting for only about 0.03 to 0.04 percent of total Kenyan imports respectively).  
  
Figure 2. Trends in Kenya imports from selected regions 
 
Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
  
Kenya’s major imports from the EAC partners include textile materials, wood, maize, paper 
and paperboard, cotton, cereals, medicines, vegetables, and unprocessed hides and skins. The 
imports from Tanzania and Uganda are mainly unprocessed agricultural products. 
 
2.2.2 Tanzania’s trade with the EAC   
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with the EU.3 In parallel, Tanzania has signed 11 bilateral trade agreements. None of these 
serves Tanzania’s exports interest better than the agreemnent with the EU.   
The EU is Tanzania’s main destination market (Figure 3). In recent years, exports to EU 
have dropped to the levels of 2000–2002, partly due to fall in fish exports, but EU still 
remains the most important destination for goods from Tanzania.4 Since the Lomé 
Convention/Cotonou (now EPA era), most of Tanzanian exports to the EU are exempt from 
import duties. In addition, Tanzania's goods enjoy non-reciprocal preferential access to the 
EU markets under Everything-But-Arm (EBA) initiative extended to LDCs in the ACP. 
Tanzania’s other main trading partners are United Arab Emirate, Switzerland, Japan, India, 
Kenya, South Africa and Malawi.  
 
Figure 3. Tanzania’s exports trends in selected regional markets   
 
Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
 
Tanzania exports primarily agricultural products — mainly cotton, coffee, tobacco, tea, 
cashew nuts, and cloves. South Africa is Tanzania’s largest trading partner in SADC, and the 
two countries have signed a memorandum of understanding on trade and industry 
programmes and a general agreement on economic, scientific, technical and cultural 
cooperation. In 2008, Tanzania’s exports to South Africa amounted to US$73.1 million, from 
                                                 
3 On November 23, 2007, Tanzania, along with other EAC Partners States, initiated an interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union; and is currently negotiating a full EPA. 
4 Tanzania has a long history of exporting fish to the EU market. In 2005, fish export to the EU dropped by 
about a third the value of the previous years (COMTRADE) and since then hasn’t picked up well. Some 
have attributed this to stiffening competition from Vietnam that also exports fish to EU market and 
declining number of fish (Nile perch) catch in Lake Victoria.  
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US$3.5 million in 2000. About a third (26.5 percent) of Tanzania’s exports in 2008 went to 
South Africa, and about 10 percent of Tanzania’s imports came from South Africa in the 
same year.  
Though it stopped being a member of COMESA, Tanzania still exports more to 
COMESA than it does to SADC, where it currently belongs. In Figure 3, we see that 
Tanzania’s exports to COMESA have grown faster than its exports to EAC or SADC in 
recent years — hence strong economic links with COMESA countries. While exports to 
SADC as a share of total exports increase by 0.6 percentage point between 2005 and 2008 
(i.e. from 9% in 2005 to 9.6% in 2008), the shares of exports to COMESA increased by about 
2 percentage point during the same period (from 13.3% to 15%). Exports to EAC as share of 
total exports increase from 6.3 percent in 2005 to 8 percent in 2008, which could have been 
attributed to reduction/elimination of intra-EAC tariffs upon introduction of the EAC 
Customs Union.  
On the imports front, the EU is the largest importer into Tanzania (Figure 4). EU imports 
into Tanzania amounted to US$1.04 billion in 2007 (accounting for 17.6 percent of 
Tanzania’s total imports that year). Other major sources of Tanzania’s imports are South 
Africa (SADC), and United Arab Emirates. 
 
Figure 4. Tanzania’s import trends from selected regions, 2001–2008   
  
Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
 
 The EAC region is not a very significant source of Tanzania’s imports, accounting for about 
2 percent of the total imports in 2007. 
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2.2.3 Uganda’s trade with the EAC   
 
As shown in Table 4, Uganda accounts for only 6 percent of intra-EAC exports, but a huge 
50 percent of intra-EAC imports. Tanzania accounts for 9 percent of intra-EAC exports 
against 26 percent of intra-EAC imports. Kenya’s share of intra-EAC exports (amounting to 
86 percent) is the largest in the region, and her share of intra-EAC imports of 4 percent is the 
lowest in the region. Kenya, therefore, runs a huge trade surplus with all the EAC countries. 
Uganda’s trade deficits with Kenya amount to over US$ 473 million and slightly over 
US$ 5million with Tanzania. Uganda’s runs a trade surplus with Rwanda and Burundi. 
 
Table 4. Intra-EAC trade flows and trade balances (million US$), average 2003 – 2005  
 
  Exporting countries   
 
Burun
di 
Rwand
a 
Kenya Tanzania Uganda Total 
Importing 
countries 
      
Burundi  0.93 36.99 23.37 0.059 73.04 
Rwanda 2.99  90.45 6.85 0.035 129.38 
Kenya 0.04 0.17  24.13 0.014 38.01 
Tanzania 0.03 0.68 486.84 13.72 0.007 501.27 
Uganda 0.04 0.07 248.26  0.001 256.53 
Total 3.10 1.85 862.55 68.07 0.003 998.24 
      
   Exporting countries   
 
Burun
di 
Rwand
a 
Kenya Tanzania Uganda Total 
Importing 
countries 
      
Burundi  -2.06 36.95 23.33 11.72 69.94 
Rwanda 2.06  90.28 6.78 28.41 127.53 
Kenya -36.95 -90.28  -224.13 -473.17 -824.54 
Tanzania -11.72 -28.41 473.17 5.56  438.60 
Uganda -23.33 -6.78 224.13  -5.56 188.46 
Total -69.94 -127.53 824.54 -188.46 -438.60  
 
Source: UN COMTRADE (adopted from World Bank, 2007) 
 
Kenya and Tanzania have improved their trade balance in relation to GDP between 2004 and 
2006, except Uganda. Intra-EAC trade rose by 21.2 percent between 2004 and 2005 and 
comprised 11 percent of total EAC trade. Increases in shares of bilateral trade (in total trade) 
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between 2004 and 2006 are further indications of improved intra-trade flows in the EAC 
member states.  
As Figure 5 shows, the EU is Uganda’s largest destination market, accounting for over 40 
percent of Uganda’s merchandise exports. Although between 2005 and 2008, Uganda’s 
exports to EU experienced a 10 percentage point decline in total merchandise exports (i.e. 
from 37 percent of total exports in 2005 to 26.9 percent in 2008), in value terms, Uganda’s 
exports to the EU rose by 55 percent during the same period.  
 
Figure 5. Selected destinations of Uganda's exports  
  
Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
 
At the regional level, the EAC and COMESA countries are Uganda’s most important trading 
partners. Exports to the EAC market rose dramatically between 2006 and 2008. This can be 
attributed to the launching of the EAC Customs Union. The EAC now accounts for 20 
percent Uganda’s merchandise exports.  
Outside EAC and COMESA, SADC countries are not very significant importers of 
Uganda’s goods. COMESA (excluding EAC countries) accounts for about 6 percent of 
Uganda’s merchandise exports in 2008, while exports to SADC-only countries, that is, 
countries in the region that are neither members of COMESA nor EAC, such as South Africa 
and Democratic Republic of Congo, amounted to 2.6 percent of total exports in 2008.  
From trade flows, while Uganda’s trade link with COMESA is strong, Uganda’s major 
trading partners in COMESA, outside EAC borders  (i.e. countries in COMESA, but not 
members of EAC ) are very few in numbers. The only noticeable one is Sudan, which 
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accounted for about 1 percent of Uganda’s total exports in 2008. However, there is evidence 
of large volume of trade especially, agricultural food communities from Uganda to Sudan 
that go unrecorded. If such trade is taken into account, Sudan could account for over 2 
percent of Uganda’s exports in 2008, and perhaps much higher in 2009 (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics and Bank of Uganda, 2008).5     
Export to COMESA and SADC as share of total exports increased by 2.2 percentage 
points (from 10.6% to 12.8%) and 0.7 percentage point (from 1.3% to 2%) respectively, 
leaving room for further expansion in exports to EAC. Uganda’s exports to EAC as a share of 
total imports rose from 8 percent in 2005 to 13.8 percent in 2008 (5.8 percentage point rise). 
This rise was also met my fall in share of exports to Asia from 7.5 percent in 2005 to slightly 
below 6 percent in 2008. This means that with the coming of the EAC Customs Union, 
Uganda is increasingly exporting more and more merchandise to the EAC than to any single 
regional market in Africa. Agricultural products constitute more than half of Uganda’s 
merchandise exports (especially coffee, tobacco, cotton, and cut flowers).   
Since 2006, the EU has dominated Uganda’s imports, overtaking imports from EAC and 
COMESA (Figure 6). Imports from EU as a share of total imports increased from 18.8 
percent in 2005 to 19.3 percent in 2008. 
 
Figure 6. Trends in Ugandan imports from selected regions 
  
Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
  
                                                 
5 Uganda Bureau of Statistics and Bank of Uganda conducted informal cross-border trade survey in 2007 
which established that Uganda’s informal agricultural exports to Sudan amounted to US$ 57.1 million that 
year, equivalent to about 3 percent Uganda’s total exports the same year.  
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Uganda’s imports from EAC as share of total imports declined substantially from 26.8 
percent in 2005 to 12.6 percent in 2008, also reflected in a drop in share of imports 
originating from COMESA (from 27 percent to 13 percent). Share of imports from SADC 
dropped slightly by 1 percentage point (i.e. 9.8 percent in 2005 to 8.8 percent in 2008). In 
recent years, SADC imports into Uganda have grown faster than Uganda’s imports from 
EAC or COMESA. South Africa is Uganda’s main trading partner in SADC. The two 
countries signed a bilateral trade agreement in 2002 (as we saw in previous chapter, Table 6).  
 
Structure of Uganda’s exports   
Table 5 provides the trends in the volume of exports for major traded commodities for the 
period 2002 to 2007.  
 
Table 5. Exports by value (‘000 US $), 2002 – 2005 
 
Commodity 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Traditional Exports     
Coffee 96,626 100,233 124,237 172,942 
Cotton 9,519 17,755 42,758 28,821 
Tea 31,293 38,314 37,258 34,274 
Tobacco  45,262 43,042 40,702 31,486 
Non-Traditional Exports     
Maize 10,609 13,724 17,896 21,261 
Beans and other Legumes 3,284 5,235 8,968 8,693 
Fish and Fish products 87,945 88,113 103,309 142,691 
Cattle hides 9,810 4,925 5,409 7,064 
Sesame seeds 510 2,183 2,788 4,779 
Soya beans 74 87 118 126 
Soap 3,434 5,553 7,708 7,194 
Electric Current 15,645 13,778 12,075 4,465 
Cocoa beans 2,023 7,001 6,801 9,638 
Cobalt 7,032 0 11,548 14,320 
Hoes and hand tools 385 580 348 1,159 
Pepper 111 176 368 594 
Vanilla 6,898 13,546 6,120 6,135 
Live animals 80 61 130 29 
Fruits 670 436 917 1,158 
Groundnuts 75 7 1 23 
Bananas 225 110 850 806 
Roses and Cut flowers 17,828 22,080 26,424 24,128 
Ginger 462 15  78 
Gold and gold compounds 60,342 38,446 61,233 73,072 
Other Precious Compounds 0 13,612 4,713 6 
Other products  46,714 77,193 114,507 183,935 
Petroleum products 10,749 27,901 27,904 32,015 
Traditional export  182,700 199,344 244,955 267,522 
Non-traditional exports 284,905 334,762 420,134 545,335 
Total 467,605 534,106 665,090 812,857 
 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
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The export sector in Uganda comprises the traditional and non-traditional traded 
commodities. The traditional export commodities include coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. The 
major non–traditional exports include fish, maize, beans, sim sim, flowers, hides and skins, 
leather products, textile, yarns and fibres. Past statistics indicate a steady increase in volume 
of exports (and real earnings) over the last twenty years. Exports grew from US$ 196 million 
in 1991 to US$ 478.75 million in 1999 (at an average rate of 25 percent per annum), and 
from US$ 665.090 million in 2004 to US$ 1,336.7 million in 2007, representing an increase 
of 10.98 percent.  
Coffee has maintained the lead as the main exchange earner although with declining share 
to the total export earnings. The share of coffee in total exports declined from 20.7 percent in 
2002 to 18.7 percent in 2003, and only increased slightly to 21.3 in 2005, following 
improvements in the international coffee prices in 2005. Coffee export receipts increased 
from US $ 96.6 million in 2002 to US $ 124.2 million in 2004 and US $ 172.9 million in 
2005 – representing and increase of 79 percent between 2002 and 2005. This is due to an 
increase in the realised average unit of world market price of coffee from US$1.0 per kg in 
2004 to US$1.4 in 2005 although the export volume of coffee decreased from 2.5 million 
bags (of 60kg) in 2004 to 2.1 million bags in 2005.   
Fish and fish products is one commodity which has picked tremendously from the non-
traditional export sector, especially since the lifting of the ban of Uganda fish in the European 
market which led to a revenue loss of 70 percent in fish sub-sector, between 1999 and 2000. 
For over six years, now, fish is ranked second (to coffee) as a foreign exchange earner for 
Uganda. It increased from US $ 88.1 million in 2003 which increased to US $ 142.7 million 
in 2005 on account of an increase in export volumes. Average unit price of fish, however, 
remained unchanged at US$3.8 per kg in 2006.   
During the last four years tea has emerged as the third main export for Uganda taking the 
place of Tobacco which now ranks fourth in the contribution to foreign exchange.  Export 
proceeds from tea and tobacco have been declining in recent years. Tea export receipts 
declined by 10.4 percent to US$34.3 million in 2005, from US$38.3 in 2003 due a fall in 
world market prices. 
The major outlet (market) for Ugandan tea is Mombasa Auction – which accounts for 80 
percent of tea export receipts. Tex Box 1 highlights some of the non-tariff barriers affecting 
the sector.  
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  Box 1. Barriers faced by Uganda tea sector   
  
  
Phyto-sanitary requirement 
International requirement is that every tea dealer should have a phyto-sanitary 
certificate, which traces the tea right back to the plantation and all subsequent handling. 
The normal international practice is for phyto-sanitary certificates to be issued by a 
competent authority in the country of origin (in this case, Uganda), not country of 
destination or transit. On the contrary, Kenyan authority require Uganda exporter to 
produce an original phyto-sanitary certificate, or otherwise a fine of of Kshs 1,000 
(equivalent to Ushs 25,000) in lieu must be paid and an extra Kshs 500 (i.e. Ushs 
12,500 at an exchange rate of 25 for the import permit).  
Border delays  
Sources in Kampala cited a number of cases where Kenyan authorities intentionally 
delayed track carrying Uganda tea from proceeding to Mombasa. A system of “convoy” 
was introduced – whereby transporters are compelled to wait at he border post for other 
trucks, before they can be allowed to depart or proceed to Mombasa.  
As trucks have to wait for convoys to move, consignment arrives late in Mombasa. This 
makes it difficult for Uganda’s tea to compete favourable at the auction. Some alleged 
that this is unfair trade practice or a deliberate mechanism by Kenyan authority to delay 
Ugandan tea to allow Kenya tea to sell.  
  
The plant Inspection Permit  
 
The Plant Inspection Permit (PIP) is the latest requirement that has been introduced by 
the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIP). It requires tea exporters to pay 
Kshs500 (Ushs 13,398 at an exchange rate of 26.796) for every loaded truck, and each 
truck is supposed to have its own certificate. The new levy introduced in September 
2007 is expensive and involves a lengthy bureaucratic inspection process that hinders 
Ugandan exporters from reaching the auction market in time. As a result, Uganda 
traders are reduced to a less competitive position compared to their Kenyan 
counterparts. Many of them have been frustrated by losses incurred from missing out on 
premium prices. 
  
The exporters have been using the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) certificate of origin which allowed them to travel to all the member states. 
The Plant Inspection Permit requirement is an extra cost to tea dealers. Each truck 
transporting tea must have its own Plant Inspection Permit, no matter how many trucks 
belong to the same company. In case of delays, an exporter incurs additional costs in 
demurrage – amounting to $200 (Ushs 340,000) per truck per day.   
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The volume of tobacco exports reached a peak level of 10,600 million tonnes in 1998/99 at 
the unit price of US$ 2.16/kg in the world market (the highest price in the last decade). It is 
generally believed that the world-wide campaign against the tobacco industry contributed to 
decreased demand for tobacco products.  
 
   Transit challenges – as observed by BAT - Uganda   
  
 British American Tobacco Uganda is a tobacco company which trades globally. Its 
major export route is Mombasa port and only uses air to send samples. It also exports 
mainly to Kenya within the East African community. 
 
Bonded warehouses are very expensive, and since Uganda has got limited bonded 
warehouses the only option they have is to keep their product in the bonded ware houses 
in Mombasa. This is so expensive that some traders end up under declaring the value of 
their products to avoid high expenses at the ware houses. 
 
The railway transport is very unreliable and it’s not an option for BAT. It is slow and its 
operations are not up to standard. When used, it delays the goods. This, therefore, leaves 
BAT with only one means of transport to Mombasa – i.e. the road. Following the recent 
event in Kenya businesses were paralysed – as the port was completely inaccessible.    
      
 
In the fifth and sixth place in Uganda’s export ranking is cotton and flowers, respectively. 
Though these commodities were ranked in the first ten main exports for Uganda, their share 
to the export revenue have continued to decline in recent years. The share for cotton to total 
export earning declined from 6.5 percent in 2004 to 3.5 percent in 2005, with corresponding 
drop in export revenues from US $ 42.7 million to US $ 28.8 million. That of flowers 
declined form 4.0 percent in 2004 to 3.0 percent in 2005, and a corresponding fall in export 
earnings from US$ 26.4 million to US$24.1 million.   
Table 6 shows Uganda’s major export destinations. About 31 percent of Uganda’s 
merchandise exports are destined to the EU, followed EAC countries (20 percent). Other 
COMESA countries (excluding EAC) account for about 6 percent of total exports. Asia 
accounts for about 9 percent of total exports. Exports to EU grew from 25 percent of total 
exports in 2000 to 41.2 percent in 2005. Export to Asia as share of total exports declined 
from 9.8 percent in 2000 to 7.5 percent in 2005.    
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Table 6. Volume of Uganda’s exports (in ‘000 US$) by regional destination, 2000 – 2007 
 
Region/Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
COMESA  93,733  122,040  107,493  147,793  177,995  249,336  283,747 506,509 
o/w Kenya  62,947  59,063  61,504  78,432  76,903  72,437 88,002 118,191 
      Tanzania  5,487  6,689  5,774  5,832  12,155  15,445 13,749 30,599 
Other Africa  32,160  33,465  55,141  45,963  37,823  38,931 37,763 87,745 
o/w South Africa  28,893  24,076  42,997  29,632  9,250  9,796 10,852 10,730 
European Union  100,021  128,237  156,386  140,529  195,849  335,174 263,752 324,395 
 o/w United Kingdom  38,690  28,806  30,015  33,883  29,438  26,831 29,959 53,284 
Other Europe  102,576  75,662  73,206  79,033  110,770  82,466 49,074 91,361 
North America  9,264  8,348  10,549  14,635  18,653  18,340 16,442 23,777 
Middle East  5,971  9,898  9,138  18,489  37,421  88,111 14,211 19,593 
Asia  39,225  52,953  42,255  49,797  53,488  61,180 198,544 190,847 
South America  332  1,138  1,286  342  379  1,005 75,194 71,937 
Rest of the World  18,348  20,023  1,505  2,334  5,029  566 899 2,472 
Unknown  0  0  10,646  35,191  27,683  20,214 297 159 
Other  3,267  9,389  12,145  16,332  16,817  0 36,483 37,465 
United States  8,545  6,743  9,190  12,693  15,182  15,892 - - 
Total 401,645 451,764 467,605 534,106 665,090 812,857 962,194 1,336,668 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
 
 
 
Table 7. Uganda’s exports to different regions as share of total exports (%) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EAC  19.69 19.29 18.48 21.56 19.82 -- -- -- 
o/w Rwanda  2.24 3.68 2.75 3.89 3.71 -- -- -- 
   Kenya   15.67 13.07 13.15 14.68 11.56 8.91 9.15 8.84 
   Burundi  0.41 1.06 1.34 1.89 2.72 -- -- -- 
   Tanzania  1.37 1.48 1.23 1.09 1.83 1.90 1.43 2.29 
COMESA (incl. EAC)  23.34 27.01 22.99 27.67 26.76 30.67 29.49 37.89 
COMESA (excl. EAC)   3.65 7.72 4.51 6.11 6.94 19.86 18.91 26.76 
European Union  76.66 72.99 77.01 72.33 73.24 41.23 27.41 24.27 
Asia  9.77 11.72 9.04 9.32 8.04 7.53 20.63 14.28 
TOTAL            1/  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.30 96.45 103.20 
 
Source: Uganda Revenue Authority and Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
Notes: 1/   Total for 2005 and 2006 are below 100% caused by under reporting and total for 2007 above 100% is due to 
double reporting for COMESA. 
 
Trends in imports 
 
Table 8 shows the trends in imports from 2003–2007. Available trade statistics show that 
total imports grew from US$ 522.7 million in 1991 to US$ 671.1 million in 1999 and from 
US$ 1,726.1 million in 2004 to US$ 3,495.4 million in 2007. About 25 percent of total 
imports originate from EAC, less than 1 percent from other COMESA countries (excluding 
EAC), and over 70 percent from rest of the world (mostly EU).  
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Petroleum (petroleum products) accounts for the largest share of import bill, annually. 
Petroleum import bill increased from US$ 161.9 million in 2001 to US$ 343.2 million in 
2005, representing an increase of 50 percent.  
 
Table 8. Imports by SITC and value (000 US$), 2003-2007 
 
SITC   Description  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
33  Petroleum, petroleum products & related materials  187,255 217,762 343,159 526,581 645,587 
78  Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles)  115,096 144,695 192,198 216,357 294,310 
04  Cereals and cereal preparations  106,698 134,431 141,194 156,768 158,779 
67  Iron and steel  77,755 96,020 118,823 141,632 173,423 
76  Telecommunications, sound recording apparatus,   48,936 82,764 100,410 137,029 349,160 
54  Medical and pharmaceutical products  74,920 80,137 85,721 123,065 175,778 
66  Non-metallic mineral manufactures  51,862 57,269 68,576 77,815 117,535 
89  Miscellaneous manufactured articles  52,358 62,078 81,723 68,211 72,442 
57  Plastics in primary forms  28,332 43,886 62,606 70,588 96,071 
72  Machinery specialized for particular industries  40,070 59,104 60,491 66,781 101,525 
77  Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances  52,178 61,971 56,843 76,873 112,604 
75  Office machines, automatic data-processing mach  37,678 36,779 50,233 48,352 70,707 
64  Paper, paperboard, articles of paper pulp  37,660 48,513 50,098 62,131 69,127 
42  Fixed vegetable fats & oils, crude, refined, etc  39,248 45,175 46,928 68,410 103,325 
65  Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, etc  36,904 40,028 42,703 53,372 73,979 
  Others    388,156   515,626     552,431        663,343  881,039 
  Total 1,375,106 1,726,238 2,054,137 2,557,308 3,495,391 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
Second in share of import, are automobiles (road vehicles), which import bill increased from 
US$89.2 million in 2001 to US$ 192.2 million in 2005. Import bill from cereals and cereal 
preparations amounted to US$141.2 million in 2005. Import bill from iron and steel increased 
by 82 percent between 2003 and 2005, that from telecommunication equipment by 180 
percent.   
Kenya is the largest source of Uganda’s imports, accounting for 30 percent of total 
imports, annually; Asia about 27 percent, and the EU about 20 percent. About 7 percent of 
total imports come from the Middle East and 7 percent from South Africa. African countries 
accounted for 36.2 percent of the total imports expenditure in 2005, which means that over 
60 percent of imports are still sourced from overseas.  
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Table 9. Imports by region (‘000 US$), 2000 – 2007 
  
Region/Country  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 
COMESA  312,246  295,695  337,711  389,630  434,154  565,011 450,419 560,321 
o/wKenya  296,033  281,472  312,870  357,327  399,152  520,686 400,965 495,687 
Other Africa  76,708  82,455  84,968  101,047  160,139  177,881 188,853 242,712 
o/w S/Africa  65,915  72,850  83,665  98,984  140,749  143,676 156,272 207,191 
Asia  224,127  259,761  292,580  382,110  499,396  540,808 749,982 1,174,968 
o/w China  29,457  36,227  44,026  70,248  103,093  109,217 138,260 274,268 
European Union  185,566  198,181  183,573  243,734  314,496  387,158 481,209 717,642 
Other Europe  27,920  34,643  27,921  24,325  11,793  21,703 69,894 66,049 
Middle East  60,270  69,319  73,904  101,707  121,883  206,879 489,218 566,592 
North America  45,454  38,439  43,149  88,031  122,926  105,723 98,615 128,779 
o/w USA 30,813 28,133 35,842 78,129 103,499 78,143 89,720 100,939 
South America  8,823  7,457  2,175  5,521  26,092  31,550 11,557 32,407 
Rest of the world  17,316  20,607  27,752  38,999  35,250  17,424 17,561 5,921 
Unknown 33 - -- -- 0 0 - - 
Total  958,464 1,006,557 1,073,732 1,375,106 1,726,128 2,054,137 2,557,308 3,495,391 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
 
 
2.2.4 Burundi’s trade with the EAC   
 
Burundi is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
the East African Community (since July 2007), the Economic Community for Great Lakes 
Countries (CEPGL)6, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). On 
November 23, 2007, Burundi, together with the other EAC Partners States, initialed an 
interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union; and is currently 
negotiating a comprehensive EPA. At the same time, Burundi enjoys preferential market 
access under the EU’s “Everything but Arms” initiative for least developed countries. In 
addition, Burundi’s exports still enjoy preferential access to the U.S. market under the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
However, the utilization rate of US and EU preferences has been rather modest and their 
value negligible, compared to other countries in the region. It is constrained by limited supply 
capacity – being a country emerging from decades of conflict. Nevertheless, the European 
Union is still one of Burundi’s most important destination market (Figure 7), accounting for 
40.6 percent of Burundi’s exports in 2008. In recent years, United Arab Emirates has been 
the most significant importer of goods from Burundi, accounting for 43 percent of  Burundi’s 
total exports in 2008. 
 
                                                 
6 Other members of CEPGL are Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
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Until recently, the EAC as a region has not been an important destination for goods from 
Burundi. In 2004 for example, only 0.5 percent of Burundi’s exports went to EAC, but in 
2008 this ratio rose to 5.8 percent. The EAC significance is being felt after Burundi joined 
the Community in 2007 with increase in exports to EAC,  comprising mainly beer, cigarettes, 
sugar, and cotton fabric; and raw hides, ornamental fish, live plants, fruits, flour, and 
vegetables.  
   
Figure 7. Selected destinations of Burundi's merchandise exports  
 
Source: COMTRADE database  
Notes: Burundi relies primarily on coffee and tea for exports.    
  
Figure 8. Trends in imports into Burundi from selected trade partners 
  
Source: COMTRADE database 
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With regards to imports, the EU is the largest importer into Burundi (Figure 8). After 2006 
imports from the EAC rose sharply (corresponding to the period of joining the EAC) but only 
faced a slight decline in 2008. Petroleum products (fuels), rolling stock and machinery, inputs 
(construction materials, metallurgical products, agricultural inputs), pharmaceutical products, 
and foodstuffs dominate Burundi’s merchandise imports. 
 
2.2.3 Rwanda’s trade with the EAC   
 
Since 2004, Rwanda has implemented a 100 percent tariff reduction on imports from the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), of which it is a member.  This 
measure is now superseded by its joining the East African Community (EAC) in 2007 and 
the gradual adoption of EAC Common External Tariff (CET) for trade with the rest of the 
world. However, Rwanda commodity exports remain largely focused on extra-EAC markets, 
especially the EU (Figure 9). Rwanda enjoys a preferential market access to the EU under the 
EU’s “Everything But Arms” initiative for the LDCs. 
   
Figure 9. Selected destinations of Rwanda's merchandise exports  
 
Source of data: COMTRADE 
Notes: Rwanda’s exports of primary commodities are largely dominated in value terms by coffee and tea.   
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the 7 percent exports growth gained in the EU markets during the same period). Though it is 
too early to judge (based on current results), the results nevertheless shows that Rwanda is 
increasingly making use of the EAC markets since it joined the Community in 2007 – which 
could see its share of intra-EAC exports increase substantially in the next two to five years.   
In addition to being a member of COMESA and the EAC, Rwanda is also a member of 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community 
of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).  Its application is also pending to join the 
SADC. Rwand’s exports to SADC market has more than tripled between 2005 and 2008 
although its share of total exports still appears insignificant. Although Rwanda has been a 
beneficiary of the trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
schemes, particulary the U.S’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) - since 2000, 
some sources have indicated that Rwanda has not been able to untilise it, and its exports to 
U.S. has remained insignificant (1 percent of its exports in 2008).  
When it comes to imports, Rwanda shows a strong reliance on imports from EAC (Figure 
14). As we saw in Table 1, the EAC accounted for 39 percent of Rwanda’s total imports in 
2005 – 2008, compared with Kenya’s (1.5%) and Tanzania’s (3.8%) share of total imports in 
2005–2008 coming from EAC countries. Again as we saw earlier, most of Rwanda’s imports 
are from Kenya (11.4% of total intra-EAC imports in 2005–2008), followed by Uganda 
(8.3%), Tanzania (3.4%), and Burundi (0.5%), while its largest regional destination market is 
Burundi, followed by Kenya, and Uganda.  
The EU is still a significant importer into Rwanda (suppasing the SADC region and 
China, for example), and its imports into Rwanda grown quite fast in recent years (Figure 10) 
- signifying an increasing economic ties Rwanda. In November 2007, Rwanda initialed an 
interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU.  
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Figure 10. Trends in Rwandan imports from selected regions 
 
Source of data: COMTRADE 
   
2.3 Informal cross–border trade    
Table 10 summarizes the transactions along the selected CBTCs and the key constraints 
faced.  
 
Table 10. Top three commodities across selected borders and major constraints 
 
Kenya—Uganda—Southern Sudan    
 Kenya Uganda Uganda Southern Sudan 
Commodity 
1. Rice  
2. Pulses/peas  
3. Potato 
  
1. Beans  
2. Maize 
3. Fish 
 
1. Maize  
2. Beans 
3. Sorghum  
 
1. Hides/skin   
2. Tobacco 
3. Groundnut  
 
Border Busia Oraba 
Constraint  
High trade cost – due to poor roads network 
connecting supply region to transport corridor; 
market and price information lacking 
High trade cost – due to poor roads 
network connecting supply region to 
transport corridor; market and price 
information lacking, poor border 
infrastructure especially the Sudan 
side  
Tanzania—Uganda—Rwanda   
 Tanzania Uganda Uganda Rwanda 
Commodity 
1. Beans   
2. Fish  
3. Rice  
 
1. Beans  
2. Maize 
3. Banana  
 
1. Maize   
2. Beans 
3. Potato  
 
1. Peas    
2. Passion fruit  
3. Vegetables 
 
Border Mutukula Katuna 
Constraint  
Traders are not a ware of customs 
procedures; Clearing Agents take advantage 
of this to charge high fees + high transport 
costs, Tanzania export ban of food and 
High taxes in Rwanda 
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corruption by police at check point 
 Tanzania Rwanda   
Commodity 
1. Rice    
2. Maize  
3. Groundnuts 
 
1. Coffee    
2. Banana*  
3. Potato 
 
  
Border Rusumo   
Constraint 
High trade cost – due to high transport cost, 
customs requirement for containerization, only 
goods below 1million RF is cleared at border 
adding to cost of  documentation, transport to 
Kigali and waiting 
 
  
 
Table 10 Continued. 
 
Tanzania—Burundi—DR Congo   
 Tanzania  Burundi Burundi  DR Congo  
Commodity 
1. Cassava    
2. Maize  
3. Groundnuts 
4. Fish  
 
Hardly any 
agric comm.  
crossing from 
Burundi  
  
1. Cassava    
2. Maize  
3. Vegetables 
4. Fish  
 
1. Milk powder 
2. Vegetables  
Very little agric 
comm.  crossing 
from DR Congo 
 
Border Kobero Gatumba–Kavivimvira 
Constraint 
Tanzania export ban on food – leading to increased 
bribing (of police); delay at customs due to 
insufficient border infrastructure and lack of 
computerization of customs operations  
 
Border customs allowed to clear 
goods up to 0.5 million BRF. Goods 
above this threshold is cleared at 
customs in Bujumbura, adding to cost 
of  waiting at Bujumbura; poor 
infrastructure at border customs 
 
 Tanzania Burundi   
Commodity 
1. Maize   
2. Rice  
3. Cassava/sorghum 
 
Agricultural commodity 
from Burundi negligible   
 
  
Border Mabamba —Gisuru   
Constraint 
Poor border customs infrastructure; capacity of 
personnel; and roads   
     
Source: Survey data 
 
Customs statistics7 indicate that, over 90 percent of Uganda’s overseas imports and exports 
transit through Busia each year. Over 90 percent of Kenyan exports to other countries in the 
Greater lakes region including Rwanda, DR Congo, Sudan, and Burundi transit through 
Busia. This clearly shows pivotal role Busia border plays in the intra-regional goods trade. 
Uganda’s informal exports to Kenya are mainly agricultural food commodities and these 
include maize, beans, fish, groundnuts, bananas and fruits.  Exports of bananas earned US $ 
4.5 million (9,906 tonnes) and fruits (which include water melons, passion fruits, mangoes, 
                                                 
7 by Uganda Revenue Authority  
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oranges) accounted for US $ 3.7 million. When informal trade is considered, cross-border 
trade in beans tops in the list of several agricultural commodities that cross from Uganda into 
Kenya at Busia (Table 11), followed by maize, fish, groundnuts and millet.  Evidence also 
shows growing importance of fruit (e.g. water melon), vegetables and export of poultry 
product (egg) into Kenya. 
However, the total value of informal exports into Kenya dropped by half between 2005 
and 2007. This dramatic fall in export was driven by decline in export of beans and maize. 
Stakeholder contacted attributed this (decline in Uganda’s food export to Kenya) to the 
emerging market in Southern Sudan. I tend to agree with this view because the growth of 
Uganda’s informal cross border trade in beans (Table 11) has been astronomical (over 320-
fold between 2005 and 2007. However, maize does not feature among leading informal food 
export to Sudan. The decline in the volume of maize into Kenya must find explanation 
somewhere else not necessarily the emerging market in Southern Sudan.  
 
Table 11. Trend in Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Kenya through Busia (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Beans       29,363,861.65             16,349,532.36            6,633,740.87  
Maize       22,740,263.86             14,969,032.87            6,512,703.49  
Fish         5,967,641.00             10,518,469.52            6,457,139.93  
Groundnuts         2,794,080.86              4,535,908.82            4,450,939.02  
Millet         3,230,721.19              2,223,930.94            3,567,249.14  
Vegetables (Tomatoes)                 6,426.86              2,049,083.54            1,852,729.71  
Eggs            756,644.12              1,031,766.85            1,461,109.50  
Water Melons            291,539.68                              -              1,369,854.02  
Others         3,949,920.81            2,874,570.59            6,022,831.70  
GROSS TOTAL     69,101,100.03          54,552,295.49       38,328,297.38  
 
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
 
The leading agricultural products from Kenya into Uganda are rice and beans.  Others 
include unprocessed coffee, tuber root crops and fruits. Rice tops among agricultural 
commodities flowing into Uganda from Kenya through the border at Busia (Table 12). 
Again, almost similar to the trends noted in Table 11, we see a dramatic decline in overall 
flow of food into Uganda, between 2006 and 2007, in particular rice and fish. This declining 
trend in informal food export could be attributed to trade diversion into other markets (such 
as Southern Sudan) and overall trends witnessed in most countries where agricultural food 
production generally declined in 2007 which culminated into 2008 food crisis.    
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Table 12. Trend in Kenya’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Busia (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Rice          98,641.35        3,164,114.21           746,325.15  
Coffee (Unprocessed)*        365,529.86           979,802.43           336,301.52  
Peas          55,374.22           102,413.44           275,468.12  
Root crop (Potatoes)        130,874.29           249,626.58           243,117.90  
Maize          50,239.43               2,491.11           120,263.97  
Fish          27,892.81           388,662.71             62,913.97  
Beans          10,396.87        1,231,486.75             36,963.72  
Passion Fruits        245,258.16             74,092.59             29,460.16  
Others        182,668.00           248,003.27           309,539.08  
GROSS TOTAL     1,166,874.99        6,440,693.09        2,160,353.59  
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
*Unprocessed. The main fruits include bananas, ripe bogoya, apple bananas, pineapples, water melon, cabbage and 
pumpkins, oranges, lemons, mangoes and tomatoes while the main vegetables include greens especially sukuma wiki 
(cordies).   
  
The intensive trade that thrives here is in agricultural products, especially in beans and maize 
from Uganda, and manufactured products from Kenya and, above all, products re-exported to 
Kenya via Mutukula coming from Tanzania. Most of the commodities exported to Kenya 
come from western Uganda, mainly Bushenyi and Mbarara districts (Table 13).  
 
Table 13. Source of commodities traded across Busia  
  
From Uganda to Kenya From Kenya to Uganda 
Commodity 
Source 
(District/Uganda) 
Commodity Source (Kenya) 
Maize Busoga, Kasese, Mbarara Carrots Bungoma 
Beans Ibanda, Mubende, Kasese Passion fruits Kisi (Nyanza Province) 
Bananas Bushenyi, Rubare Irish potatoes 
Bukusu & Rift Valley 
Province - West Pokot,  
Molo (Nakuru) & 
Elbergon 
Groundnuts Teso, Soroti, Lira Mangoes (dodo) Mombasa 
Millet Soroti, Bushenyi, Ibanda   
Tomatoes Bugerere   
Water melon Bushenyi, Busia   
Pineapples Bugerere, Mbale   
Bogoya & Cabbage Mbale   
Pumpkins 
Bushenyi, Sheema, 
Ibanda 
  
 
The data on informal trade in Table 14 is an indication of the general rise in trade with 
southern Sudan in recent years. It is surprising why maize, which is Uganda’s leading 
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agricultural export to Sudan is not captured by this table. The reason could be that maize is 
going through Biba border, but this only part of the reason. It is possible that the time the 
informal survey was conducted was off season for maize, and could not feature among top 
ten commodities.  However, all the people interviewed agreed that maize tops among 
southern Sudan’s agricultural imports from Uganda through the Oraba border.     
 
Table 14. Trend in Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Southern Sudan through Oraba (US$) 
 
 2005                        2006  2007 
Fish              688,267.89                 875,562.48          18,537,472.14  
Onions              160,854.86                              -              6,406,531.83  
Beans              146,380.42                  88,699.33            4,687,165.82  
Chicken               11,751.21                       42,925            2,532,402.28  
Cattle                 9,086.64                       27,765            2,467,518.53  
Bananas               12,351.02                111,469.87            2,386,751.46  
Root crops (Potatoes)               91,787.35                  54,436.35            2,366,840.24  
Tomatoes               21,017.08  8414.43           2,346,820.39  
Others            471,499.42               454,045.98          15,378,895.35  
Gross Total         1,612,995.89            1,663,318.14          57,110,398.04  
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
  
The data in Table 15 clearly confirms that Uganda significantly dominates the cross border 
trade with Sudan. Nonetheless, there are signs of great potential for rice, live animals and 
livestock products from southern Sudan. It is easy to see in Table 8 that value of export of 
goats, beef and rice has gone up significantly 2006 and 2007 and could even be much higher 
in 2008. High demand for hides and skins by Uganda’s industries also provide great 
opportunity for Sudan’s hides and skin industry which could see significant rise in export of 
these products in near future.   
 
Table 15. Trend in Sudan’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Oraba (US$) 
                   2005  2006 2007 
Hides & Skins             18,909.68           135,825.54               93,324.4  
Tobacco              1,963.62                          -                 51,377.4  
Beef                        -                    771.85               34,188.6  
Ground Nuts           296,794.28             32,993.63               30,402.2  
Rice                 405.08               4,147.12               24,676.2  
Meat              1,135.86                          -                 22,573.9  
Goats             23,651.92             12,318.89               18,609.0  
Beans              2,722.72             12,260.09               15,695.3  
Others           76,723.11             54,684.50               70,959.0  
GROSS TOTAL         422,306.27           253,001.62             361,805.9  
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
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Informal trade through Mutukula (Uganda – Tanzania border) 
Table 16 and 17 depict a positive trend in informal trade in recent years. Although the year 
2007 witnessed a general decline in trade a cross a range of commodities, particularly 
Tanzania’s imports from Uganda, comparison of 2005 and 2006 trade figures suggests that 
year 2007 was exceptional.   
 
Table 16 Trend in Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Tanzania through Mutukula (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Beans               80,958.88                 800,327.29              1,396,358.8  
Maize              644,329.20              5,771,861.22              1,228,722.0  
Bananas                 2,472.80                   41,624.95                 340,842.4  
Millet                          -                           7,400                 125,681.8  
Eggs                 3,802.57                   19,141.69                 105,450.4  
Sorghum                          -                               48                   57,981.4  
Groundnuts                       3.03                 154,766.65                   45,895.2  
Coffee                     37.28                   57,863.05                   36,834.8  
Others                5,704.60                      50,415                   85,165.9  
GROSS TOTAL            737,308.36              6,903,447.9              3,422,932.6  
 Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
 
Mutukula has been experiencing unprecedented informal trade flows. There is a seven 
feet trench, which was dug in the 1970s to separate the two countries. It is currently filled 
with logs and sand, and is being used by vehicles to ferry goods in guise of carrying 
firewood. 
 
Table 17. Trend in Tanzania’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Mutukula (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Coffee (Unprocessed)                     360                919,663             498,901.8  
Beans                 12,705                568,747             250,009.3  
Fish                   2,471                128,506             187,329.4  
Rice                196,087                395,998             123,745.8  
Meat                     212                  58,534               45,465.5  
Peas                        -                  761,543               41,424.4  
Bananas                 14,816                  79,838               35,731.9  
Milk (Fresh)                        -                    30,230               19,909.0  
Others                  6,801                125,973               95,687.2  
GROSS TOTAL           233,451.8          3,069,031.6          1,298,204.3  
 Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
 
Informal trade across Rusumo (Tanzania—Rwanda) border 
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Rusumo corridor — is the main link between Tanzania and Rwanda. It connects to DRC 
Congo through Goma and other outlets along Rwanda—DR Congo borders, and with the port 
of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. Rusumo is second only to Katuna in the volume of trade flow 
into Rwanda. Rwanda regularly records production shortages and has to import from other 
countries in the region —mainly Uganda and Tanzania —to meet its consumption needs. 
Food security in Rwanda, therefore, depends largely on cross-border trade in agricultural 
products with Uganda and Tanzania, although agricultural supplies from Tanzania have 
proved to be very seasonal due to insufficient production and administrative control over 
trade in cereals and the ban on food exports, particularly rice. 
The intensive trade that thrives here is in agricultural products, especially in cereals (rice 
and maize) and groundnuts from Tanzania. Other products that pass through this corridor are 
tea and coffee from Rwanda, and manufactured products from Kenya and, above all, products 
re-exported to Rwanda via Kenya and Tanzania coming from within the region. On average 
(as records at customs suggest), 40 goods-trucks cross to Rwanda through Rusumo border 
every day. 
 
Informal trade through Katuna (Rwanda—Uganda) border 
 
From Uganda to Rwanda, the principal routes are Kampala–Kagitumba–Kigali and 
Kampala–Gatuna– Kigali. Katuna is the busiest customs post along the Uganda – 
Rwanda border for both formal and informal trade. It connects the segment of the 
northern corridor route that extends to Kigali (Rwanda) and Bujumbura (in Burundi). It is 
about 90 kilometers from Kigali and 22 km from Kabale. Uganda exports mainly maize, 
beans, bananas, potato and groundnuts to Rwanda. Although formal trade statistics at 
disaggregated level is hard to come by, it is easy to see from Tables 18 and 19 (on 
informal trade flows) that the magnitude of cross border agricultural trade between the 
two countries is substantial. 
When informal cross-border trade is considered, the growth of trade over the last three 
years in which data is available has been quite dramatic, particularly for maize and 
banana exports form Uganda (Table 18) 
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Table 18 Trend in Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Rwanda through Katuna (US$) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 
Maize 
             
289,363.51              1,142,373.71            3,883,483.81  
Beans 
             
150,020.42                 973,544.50            1,006,246.21  
Potatoes (Irish)             755,656.52                              -                 947,075.25  
Bananas             325,506.09                 272,280.61               655,456.54  
Tobacco             337,916.77                 459,401.76               600,985.58  
Sorghum                  8,480.0                    4,077.63               147,294.54  
Pineapple                  6,961.8                           7.80               139,778.68  
Apples                  8,878.1                              -                 131,256.81  
Others              262,317.7                    393,634               387,144.94  
GROSS TOTAL         2,145,100.84            3,245,320.43            7,898,722.36  
Note: According to Key informant interviews, maize flour and wheat flour are the leading commodities 
from Uganda to Rwanda, followed by Irish potatoes and bananas. 
 
Table 19. Trend in Rwanda’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Katuna (US$) 
 2005 2006 2007 
Peas           123,103.71                147,368               70,393.3  
Passion Fruits           109,167.19                211,665               63,184.8  
Ovacadoes             13,678.34                  20,000               37,784.9  
Onions                       21                  12,645               32,817.6  
Chicken                 52,607                          -                 27,761.5  
Berries                        -                            -                 15,763.6  
Egg Plants                   1,528                          -                   8,815.0  
Cabbages                     390                          -                   4,217.7  
Others                12,346                    8,840               12,433.8  
GROSS TOTAL           312,841.3             400,518.6             273,172.2  
 
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data base 
Key informant sources indicate fruits, peas, hides and skins as topping the list of commodities crossing into 
Uganda (through Katuna). 
 
Trade across Gatumba/Kavivimvira (Burundi—DR Congo) border 
 
Gatumba – Kavivimvira border points8 are located about four kilometers from Bujumbura. 
Very low level of cross-border trade activities takes place here. This is reflected in the poor 
infrastructure at the customs. In Burundi, Gatumba is not recognized as important place for 
cross-border trade 
                                                 
8 The entry into Burundi is called Gatumba and the point of entry into DR Congo is called 
Kavivimvira.  
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Customs formalities   
At Gatumba post (in Burundi), a single import consignment exceeding BFr 0.5 million is 
beyond threshold that the customs authority at the border is allowed to clear.  
The Bujumbura port clears all goods above this threshold, entering Burundi through all its 
border crossings. This happens because most of the border posts are largely nonfunctional. 
The clearance paperwork undergoes a process of control and verification simultaneously with 
the actual goods. The estimated time to complete this process (of clearance) is three to seven 
days. The great concern, however, is that during the same period, traders still face fees for 
services on the trucks, including truck fees of USD250 per day and parking fees of BFr 9,000 
per truck per day.  
  
Customs formalities (at Bujumbura) are very lengthy — involving the following steps:  
 Presentation of PAC (summary statement of goods completed at the office of entry) 
at the customs clearance office 
 Presentation of freight manifest (number of packages, quantities, and weights) by the 
hauler 
 Intake and entry of manifest data by customs 
 Unloading of cargo in Bujumbura Port Authority (Exploitation du Port de 
Bujumbura) warehouses 
 Customs declaration by a customs clearance agency 
 Documentary/physical verification of quantities and value of goods by the customs 
office 
 Verification of the customs declaration by customs: acceptance/rectification of the 
declaration 
 Payment of customs duties and taxes by the importer  
 Issuance of the removal order by the office chief 
 Removal of goods by the importer 
 
Trade across Mabamba— Gisuru (Tanzania—Burundi) border 
 
There are six border points along the borders between Tanzania and Burundi—ranked in 
Table 20 in ascending order of their importance. 
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  Table 20. Border points along Tanzania—Burundi borders   
Border Location (province) Commodity  Rank  
Kobero Ruyinga Province Cassava, maize 1 
Rumonge 
Bururi, on Lake 
Tangayika Cassava, maize 2 
Gahumo Cokuzo Province Maize, cassava 3 
Mugina Mukamba Province Cassava 4 
Kayogoro Mukamba Province Cassava 5 
Gisuru Ruyigi Province Maize, groundnut, sorghum, cassava 6 
  
Trading across Mabamba— Gisuru border points  
Mabamba—Gisuru borders9 account for less than 5 percent of the aggregate cross-border 
trade taking place between Tanzania and Burundi (Kobero being the most preferred border). 
Table 21 shows the trends of agricultural imports into Burundi through Gicuru in July 2008. 
  
Table 21. Agricultural imports cleared at Gicuru Customs, Burundi in July 2008 
  
Date Commodity Value in Bfr 
Volume in 
tons Customs duty in Bfr 
7/7/2008 Cassava 5,100,000 17.0 25,520 
8/7/2008 Cassava 2,100,000 7.0 10,520 
9/7/2008 Maize 2,000,000 6.0 4,520 
9/7/2008 Cassava 1,500,000 5.0 7,520 
10/7/2008 Cassava 5,100,000 17.0 25,520 
13/7/2008 Maize 900,000 6.0 4,520 
13/7/2008 Groundnut 2,400,000 6.0 12,020 
14/7/2008 Maize 900,000 6.0 4,520 
19/7/2008 Cassava 5,100,000 17.0 25,520 
21/7/2008 Maize 1,500,000 10.0 7,520 
21/7/2008 Maize 1,500,000 10.0 7,520 
21/7/2008 Cassava 2,400,000 8.0 12,020 
21/7/2008 Cassava 1,800,000 6.0 9,020 
22/7/2008 Maize 1,050,000 7.0 5,270 
25/7/2008 Maize 1,200,000 8.0 6,020 
27/7/2008 Cassava 5,100,000 17.0 25,520 
30/7/2008 Maize 1,900,000 10.0 7,520 
31/7/2008 Groundnut 1,200,00 4.0 6,020 
Source: Gicuru Customs 
Note: 1 US$ = 1240 BFr 
 
The formal trade across this border flows in only one direction: from Tanzania to Burundi i.e. 
all the supplies are from Tanzania as confirmed by records at Mabamba and Gisuru customs. 
The main traded commodities are maize, groundnuts and cassava. 
                                                 
9 The entry into Tanzania is called Mabamba and the point of entry into Burundi is called Gisuru —
separated, about 5 kilometres apart.  
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For the two days I was at the border, I never saw a single truck or vehicle crossing the border. 
Informants attribute the low level of trade flow on this corridor to the sorrow state of roads. 
When asked why the border is not busy one official at the customs said, “people don’t want 
to break their cars. They use other borders.” Many business people complained of poor 
border infrastructure and attitude of customs officials particularly at Mabamba.  
The corridor served by these borders extends up to the Tanzania port of Dar-es-Salaam by 
road, and on the Burundi side, up to Bujumbura — stretching over a distance of over 1,000 
kilometer (400km from Gisuru to Bujumbura, and 600 from Mabamba to Dar-es-Salaam). 
Various spots along this route—for example, the Gicuru–Rujigi segment spanning around 50 
kilometers—are in extremely poor condition, in need of rehabilitation.  
Overloaded freight vehicles coupled with poor roads maintenance, and poor enforcement 
of axle load regulations further deteriorate the road network and reduce road life spans. 
Unlike the other countries traversed by trade corridors in which there are limits on axle loads, 
Burundi has no weight restrictions on road traffic. Burundi also has longer-term problems 
with road security, and travel between 6:00 p.m.—8:00 a.m. is restricted. 
 
Magnitude of informal trade 
While statistics on magnitude of informal trade across Mabamba—Gisuru borders is not 
available, all the people talked to at the borders agree that a large part of trade across 
Mabamba—Gisuru borders is informal trade, and that direction of trade in over 95 percent of 
the cases is from Tanzania to Burundi. That is, almost every thing comes from Tanzania —the 
commonly traded commodities include maize, followed by groundnuts, sorghum, cassava and 
rice. Most of the maize comes from Kibondo district – in Busunju area in particular – about 
40 km from the border corridor. Transport from producing areas to the market is difficult 
because of poor infrastructure. Other important production areas are Iringa in the cental 
province, Mbeya, and Rukwa, and Kasura. Cassava is the main staple.  
 
Trade across Kobero (Tanzania—Burundi) border  
 
Kobero is the busiest border point along the Tanzania-Burundi borders, used for most of the 
merchandise (over 80 percent) between Tanzania and Burundi including fuel and tea and 
coffee exports. It is located about 150km from Bujumbura and about 1000km from Dar-es-
Salaam. It has sufficiently well developed infrastructure to facilitate trade. Roads on either 
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side of the borders customs are tarmac. Supporting institutions such as police, immigration, 
and revenue agents are well established. There are well developed storage facilities on 
Burundi and Tanzania side of the border.    
Kobero handles goods enroute through Mwanza and Dar es Salaam, and can be the 
gateway for goods from Uganda and Kenya through Lake Victoria. The roads on the 
Tanzania side have been paved, with the exception of the Manyoni–Singiola (90 km) 
segment. In Burundi, the Bugarama–Bujumbura segment (spanning around 40 km) is in poor 
condition. Average travel time for cargo – between the border and Bujumbura - is ten to 
twelve hours. Roundtrip cargo shipment time is estimated at about one month, taking into 
account the time required for travel, various customs and administrative formalities required, 
and loading/unloading at Dar es Salam and Bujumbura, as well as the truck maintenance. 
 
a)  Commodities from Tanzania   
Maize tops the list of commodities crossing to Burundi in terms of volume (and value), 
followed by cassava, rice and fish and groundnuts. Cross-border trade in livestock also takes 
place. 
 
b)  Commodities from Burundi   
Cross-border flows of cereals are difficult to quantify because, unlike the trade in livestock, 
they are not subjected to custom registration procedures at borders.  
 
Magnitude of cross border trade in agriculture 
While official statistics on magnitude of cross-border trade flows are hardly available, 
besides scattered records that are available at customs office, all participants interviewed 
agree that significant volume of trade takes place and that it continues to grow in magnitude 
every year. It was possible to confirm that this is true, when I observed what was taking place 
at the border and had the chance to looked at records at customs. For example, during 1-23 
June 2009, I noticed that fish imports from Tanzania amounted to 132,325,000 BFr, while 
31,497,500 BFr worth of maize was imported.   
 
 
The next sections examine these corridors in greater details.  
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3 Transit routes, procedures and requirements  
Uganda, being a land-locked country, relies on the ports of Mombassa and Dar-es-Salaam to 
transit her exports and imports. Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Eastern Congo rely on the 
Northern and Central Transit Corridors (Mombassa and Dar es Salaam ports, respectively) 
for their external trade activities. 
  
3.1 The Northern Corridor   
The Northern Corridor comprises roads, rails and Lakes-network from the Kenyan port of 
Mombasa to Kampala. On surface mode, it consists of road routes from Mombasa via Malaba 
and Busia to Kampala – Mbarara /Kabale onward to Kigali and Butare in Rwanda, and to 
Bujumbura in Burundi. It is estimated that 85–90 percent of Uganda’s exports and imports 
pass through the Northern Corridor. 
 
The Northern Corridor is the main route for Uganda’s external trade flows, carrying an 
average of 88 per cent of the traffic in the period 1998-2004 (Table 8) - Mombasa being 
Uganda’s closest ocean port.  
 
Table 22. Uganda’s external trade movements on the Northern and Central corridors (‘000 tonnes) 
 
Traffic stream 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All surface modes on corridors                
Northern Corridor across Kenya border   1/ 1,053 1,266 1,393 2,087 2,138 2,367 2,762 
Central Corridor 98 260 251 278 284 263 348 
Total all surface modes 1,151 1,527 1,644 2,366 2,422 2,630 3,111 
Northern Corridor share of corridor traffic (%) 91.45 82.95 84.75 88.24 88.27 89.99 88.80 
Flows of goods trade by rail               
Northern Corridor  469 514 563 566 623 595 528 
Central Corridor 86 226 218 242 247 229 303 
Rail sub-total 554 741 781 808 870 824 831 
Rail share of total traffic (%) 48.16 48.52 47.51 34.16 35.93% 31.33 26.71 
Rail share of Northern Corridor traffic (%) 44.53 40.61 40.41 27.12 29.14 25.14 19.11 
 
Source: World Bank (2006) Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, the World Bank, Washington, D.C. based on Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS), Kenya Port Authority (KPA), Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA), and Uganda Railways Corporation (URC). 
Notes: 1/ data are estimates (may not reflect the regional movements accurately). 
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Over 90 percent of Uganda’s overseas imports and exports transit through Mombasa each 
year. Dar es Salaam caters for less than 4 percent, and about 2 percent are air freighted each 
year.  Uganda’s traffic through Mombasa is also seen to be growing each year, while its 
traffic through Dar es Salaam appears to be declining each year. The share of railways in 
Northern Corridor traffic has declined substantially (from 44.5 per cent in 1998 to 19 per cent 
in 2004). 
The Northern Corridor is also regarded as the life line of the Great Lakes region as it 
accounts for over 80 percent of the cargo (exports/imports) - by road (Table 8). Along the 
Northern Corridor, Kampala represents a major transportation hub in the region – into 
Southern Sudan, Northeastern DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. While Rwanda and Burundi 
receive a good number of their imports through Tanzania, an estimated 80 million people in 
the region consume goods transported through Kampala – approximately 10 percent of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s total population.  
In 1985, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed 
the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement (NCTA) aimed at simplifying and harmonising 
procedures relevant to the expeditious movement of goods in transit. The agreement provided 
for establishment of Transit Transportation Coordination Authority (TTCA), which is 
responsible for implementation of NCTA particularly matters related to transit traffic.  
The northern corridor has tried to sustain its traditional role as the main route to the 
landlocked countries. However, TTCA has not been fully successful in reducing the transit 
barriers along this route, such as delays and high transaction costs created by bureaucratic 
customs procedures, restricted axle load limits and too many weigh bridges, police roadblocks, 
etc. (Tex Box 2). These problems are perceived to have been created by the rigidities in 
government management at transit points, lack of political commitment and political 
instability in some countries in the region. 
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Text Box 2: Major problems faced along the Northern Corridor 
 
(BASED ON STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS)  
  
  
1.1 The roads conditions deteriorated on most sections of the route owing to insufficient 
maintenance and axle overloads; 
1.2 Inefficiencies along the corridor have led to slow speed, and long transit time. Increased 
transit times and operating costs have led to increased transit costs that are born by the 
consumer; 
1.3 Inadequate facilities at Nakawa inland depot (in Uganda) and other container depots has 
led to delays in clearing imports and exports by customs (Uganda Revenue Authority); 
1.4 Lengthy documentation and customs procedures and too many uncoordinated 
institutions involved in the processing of papers (at port of Mombasa and border 
crossing points). The facilities at Malaba (Kenya-Uganda border crossing point) are 
inadequate – impeding the free flow of transit traffic; 
1.5 The Rift Valley Railways runs on an old rail network and has a shortage of locomotive 
powers and wagons. This impedes transportation by rail – making road transport the 
most preferred though expensive option;  
1.6 The strict enforcement of axle load limits leads to less tonnage for most vehicles. This is 
unfavourable to cargo transporters, some of whom have ended up paying fines or 
corruptly paying their way through the weigh bridges or have had the excess cargo off 
loaded in places where there are no cargo storage facilities, especially at the border 
points; 
1.7 It takes seven days to transport goods from Mombasa to the Kenya-Uganda Malaba 
border-post. Without barriers along the route, it should take 3-4 days. Port procedures 
take over 60 hours followed by border post procedures that take 15 hours; 
1.8 Border crossing procedures, too many weighbridges and road blocks and insecurity are 
barriers to the smooth flow of cargo increase the cost of doing business along the 
Northern Corridor. 
1.9 Barriers introduced along the route have a double effect of increasing the transit time 
and costs of transport, thereby impacting negatively on the economy of landlocked 
countries.  
1.10 Congestion of trucks at the port, transit fees, various national documents and inland 
terminal or transit parking yards procedures and facilities.  
  
      
 
The barriers highlighted in Text Box 2 are elaborated in subsequent sections 3.1.1 – 3.1.6.  
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3.1.1 Transit procedures and requirements   
Of the five EAC countries, only Kenya and Tanzania have access to the seaport and the rest 
get their imports or are able to export after going through transit procedures. All the officials 
interviewed in government and private sector (in Kampala) agreed that port and border 
crossing procedures top among the barriers along the Northern Corridor.   
Port procedures take over 60 hours – i.e. it takes about two weeks in most cases, to have 
goods cleared by Kenya Port Authority. This result is similar to the findings of the World 
Bank Trade Diagnostic study which showed that transit cargo spent (on average) 17.9 days in 
Mombasa port (based on a sample of 802 import containers in the first 14 days of October 
2005, using KPA data of containers railed from the port).  For a sub-set of 177 boxes 
destined to Uganda and beyond, the time spent at the port was much higher at 37.5 days, 
while that of the 625 Kenyan boxes was 12.4 days10.   
These figures are very high compared with those for some other developing countries 
compiled by the World Bank (reproduced in Table 9). Based on the data provided by the 
World Bank (2006), the reasonable time for stay at port should be 7 days instead of 37.5 days 
for cargo at Mombasa destined for Uganda. 
 
Table 23. Customs Processing Times (in days) 
 
  General Green Channel* Yellow Channel Red Channel Period 
Bolivia 2.2 1.6 2.0 3.0 Jan-June 2003 
Ghana KIA Airport   75 per cent clearance the same day   
Ghana Tema Port   44 per cent clearance in two days   
Morocco 0.025       March 2003 
Mozambique 8       mid 2002 
Peru   0.1 0.5 1.0 2002 
The Philippines   0.8 1.0 0.8 
December 
1997 
Turkey   Within one day: 71.5 per cent of imports 2002 
    Within 2 days:  82.5 per cent of imports   
Uganda  Up to one week    
  Under simplified procedures: Single item cargo: one day 
    Mixed cargo: three days     
 Source: Customs Modernization Handbook, 2005, the World Bank. 
 
Question being asked is how to improve transparency and efficiency (in the clearance and 
release of goods), especially at the port. Documentary requirements, excessive transit fees, 
                                                 
10 Time at port refers to the time taken from unloading containers to exiting ports and from entering port to loading on 
ships).   
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and costs of warehouse and offloading imports at the port (with short grace periods given on 
imports before applying demurrage charges), as well as corruption, all add to the difficulty 
and cost of trading. Together with the already high transport costs, these result in landlocked 
countries, particularly Uganda, failing to be competitive.   
There are indirect costs associated with these delays.  For example, inventory holding 
costs caused by goods waiting in the ports, with each 10 days of delay is equivalent to about 
0.5 percent of the value of goods in additional inventory costs.11  There is also cost resulting 
from goods not being available for use.  Hammels (2001) has estimated that such cost 
amounts to 0.8 percent of the value of goods per day, based on a study of what exporters are 
willing to pay for reducing transit time of manufactured goods.  
With high port/warehouse charges, the level of damages at the port continues to rise while 
traders struggle to raise money, and delay to pick their goods. In early-May 2008, 
approximately 8000 containers were reported to have been affected at the Mombassa port. 
This problem does not seem to affect Kenya as much as Uganda since the port is in Kenya. It 
also became increasingly apparent that a number of traders were resentful about the 
treatment they receive at the Kenyan port of Mombasa. “We are treated as ‘strangers’, not as 
part of the EAC. We pay the same high charges, like ‘foreigners’ do”, they complained.  
The new EAC transit licenses - being issued as part of the new EAC transit regulations – 
amount to multiple fees: US$1,500 for a Company Transit License, US$600 for a Transit 
Goods License and KShs10 million for a security bond on goods in transit. A number of 
cargo transporters felt that these fees are quite excessive, and a few others reported that they 
were not aware of the new EAC transit regulations. Besides, different countries continued to 
charge their own rates. For example, it costs Ushs 500,000 (approx. Kshs 20,000) for a transit 
licence in Uganda, but KShs 42,000 (approx. Ushs 1,050,000) for one in Kenya – which is 
more than two times the rate in Uganda. 
Transit goods licences issued by Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) only allows goods to 
be routed through Kenya, but not local transportation within Kenya. The licenses prohibit 
transportation of locally produced goods from Kenya as exports. It prohibits transportation of 
goods from Uganda into Kenya as imports, as would be the normal occurrence on returning 
the truck to Kenya. Such restrictions, according to Uganda’s importers escalate transport 
costs because they have to send back an empty truck which they should have used to 
                                                 
11 Assuming interest rate of 20 percent  
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transport some Ugandan exports. Some traders asked, “If the COMESA Yellow Card can be 
acceptable in the region, why isn’t the Transit Goods Licence the same?” 
Contrary to the East African Community Protocol, Kenya (and so is Tanzania and 
Rwanda) charge fees on each truck entering their territory (what some traders referred to as 
road toll). Kenya charges US$60 for truck going up to Nairobi and $90 beyond Nairobi 
(Rwanda charges US$76 on each truck, while Tanzania charges US$50 dollars). Besides, 
Mombasa Municipality has introduced a new levy on Uganda bound trucks.  
From discussion with transporters, it was also mentioned that Uganda-registered trucks 
were not allowed to re-fuel in Rwanda. Since fuel prices are lower in Rwanda than they are in 
Uganda, refuelling Uganda’s trucks in Rwanda is equated to smuggling. Ugandan 
transporters have to make sure that they have enough fuel before crossing Rwanda border to 
avoid getting stranded in Rwanda. Close to this, the EAC transit regulation allows a grace 
period of 7 days without payment of Temporary Road License – for vehicles entering the 
territory of a partner state, but it is not being followed in some countries.    
 
3.1.2 Delays at weighbridges, and variation in axle load limits   
The customs checkpoints and mandatory weighbridges (along with poor roads) for goods in 
transit contribute greatly to transportation costs and serve as a real impediment to trade. 
Trucks are weighed on the way, causing delays to move goods from one territory to another. 
The acceptable weights are not harmonised in the region, causing conflicts. 
Again, transporters must know what type of commercial trucks is accepted in different 
states because partner states do not agree on the same axle loading. This has contributed to 
limiting access to certain markets. In extreme examples, entries were temporary denied, even 
with the ‘right’ axle loading. Stories were narrated of Uganda registered trucks that were 
temporary denied transit permits to Congo by Rwandan authority in recent past. The reasons 
for this are not very clear, but the concern has been that “Ugandan trucks spoil their roads”.  
 
3.1.3 Customs documentation /border post procedures   
One of the expectations from a customs union – anywhere in the world – is the simplification 
and harmonisation of customs procedures, documents and formalities, including the 
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standardisation of certificates of origin. This is yet to be seen in the EAC. Failure to fully 
achieve this has resulted in, for example, the continued use of COMESA certificates by 
Kenyan and Ugandan businesses, which they are entitled to do as they are still members of 
the preference trade area (PTA).  
We are also witnessing varying systems of import declaration, payment of applicable duty 
rates, working hours at the customs posts, and standards (Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
requirements) applied by EAC member states. We heard about lengthy procedures, unfair 
treatment, corruption (at customs) and inadequate information to enable officials at customs 
make the right decisions. Some of the customs delays were attributed to limited working 
hours at the customs posts.12 
At border posts, every country seems to be stuck to a different system of documentation, 
from the rest. Uganda uses ASYCUDA ++ (to implement key customs processes of cargo 
control, transit, entry processing, warehouse control and accounting). Kenya uses SIMBA. 
The problem around the link between these two systems has not been fully resolved yet. This 
does not help to speed up the process across customs where processes are supposed to be 
harmonised. A few years back, Kenya and Uganda concluded a bilateral agreement, which 
provides the necessary legal framework for joint controls at their common border posts, sort 
of creating a one–stop border posts, but this is yet to be seen in practice.  
Besides, the two countries had agreed in the past to take immediate steps towards the 
introduction of a 24-hour service at their common border posts. This is yet to be 
implemented. It would also appear that the directive by the minister of roads and public 
works in Kenya, to the effect that transit trucks be weighed once and issued with certificates, 
has not been fully complied with. 
At the same time, concerns about delays in processing export papers have been heard. 
Before transporters leave Kampala, it is a requirement that they file export papers with URA 
which are then sent to the border point. It was learnt that these papers often reach the border 
point late, and transporters are made to wait for 2 to 3 days. Goods are physically inspected 
in many cases, particularly where they involve refund or drawback claims, regardless of the 
compliance record of the exporter. This can unnecessarily slow down the operations of the 
exporter. 
                                                 
12 It takes about one week for process at KRA to be completed. 
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Traders who export goods to Francophone countries (e.g. Burundi) pay a fee $300 to 
translate the regulations (required documents) to English - at Jomo Kenyatta International 
Airport. They see this as a great inconvenience to them. Ugandan traders have suggested that 
Regulations should be translated in all the official languages spoken in EA community by the 
issuing country.  
Some Ugandan importers also complained that while in Kenya, they are restricted from 
using Uganda’s registered Clearing Agents, to clear goods in Kenya. They are forced to hire 
Kenyan clearing agents who, most times, are very expensive and some of them are dubious.  
 
3.1.4 Import and export inspection and certification procedures   
The EAC partners states have adopted (or are expected to adopt) the EAC harmonised 
standards of goods traded within the region (and supposed to be enacted into law – a 
mechanism that ensures mutual recognition of national quality marks on products by national 
standards agencies (Bureaus of Standards). The mechanism agreed by the Partner States 
exempt the goods from vigorous verification upon importation once they bear the quality 
marks.  
This has not been implemented. Clearly, the concerns are on: product verification and 
inspection (that have continued despite quality marks or certificate by national agencies) and 
inspection fees (on goods in transit). Ugandan tea is transited through Kenya to countries 
outside the region like Pakistan. At the Kenyan-boarder, an inspection fee of $400 is levied in 
disregards of inspection that was done in Uganda before tea left the country. Government 
will also accept that there are many agencies involved in import and export inspection and 
certification, amounting to duplication and additional costs. This is the second concern. 
Why some stakeholders may have the impression that government agencies are not 
coordinated arise from that fact that some institutions have duplicated roles or functions. 
Numerous public agencies play a role in the management of food safety, agricultural health 
and/or quality standards in Uganda.  The most important government entities in this area are:  
 Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) 
 Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) 
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 Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), especially: Department 
of Livestock and Entomology; Department of Animal Production; Department of Crop 
Protection (DCP); Department of Fisheries Resources  
 Ministry of Health (MOH), Environmental Health Division 
 National Drugs Authority (NDA); Uganda Police.  
 
While SPS is the mandate of the ministry of agriculture, there are instances where several 
government agencies converge with competing roles and influences on the SPS issues. Up to 
now, it has never been resolved whether the issue of food safety should be the mandate of the 
ministry of agriculture or ministry of health or National Drug Authority as all of them 
struggle to exert influence on regulations in this matter. This is a self-imposed bureaucratic 
issue that needs to be resolved to facilitate trade. 
The agencies with the most direct involvement in the adoption or enforcement of 
standards for traded agro-food products are UNBS, and the various listed MAAIF 
departments. Many of these agencies need to work closely with health, veterinary, or other 
departments at the district local government level, presenting considerable challenges of 
coordination.  
The inspection bodies have not developed the capacity to have laboratories at the entry 
and exit points which should have been the ideal situation. The issue of accreditation of 
laboratories as a requirement for compliance is one that sometimes gives the stakeholders the 
impression that the inspecting agencies are not coordinated. According to government 
officials, not many stakeholders appreciate the need for accreditation of laboratories. That is 
why you hear many complaints about cumbersome inspection requirements, strict standard 
requirements and inspection charges.  
 
3.1.5 Police road blocks, bribery and corruption   
Police road blocks were constantly cited, and appear not to be serving the purpose for which 
they are intended. There are about 10 police controls (roadblocks), from Mombasa to Uganda 
border (it used to be about 27 in the past, 4-10 years ago). They lead to rent seeking and 
transit delays. It is estimated that 12 percent of checks (of commercial vehicles) take more 
than 1 hour. In some cases, police and local government check points at the border cause 
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delays even for returning vehicles not carrying goods. Some stakeholders have accused 
police for using roadblocks to solicit bribes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.6 Infrastructure constraints  
Problems cited relate to electricity power supply in Uganda, non functioning railways 
transport, inadequate vessels on Lake Victoria, and poor roads network. The roads conditions 
deteriorated on most sections of the route owing to insufficient maintenance and axle 
overloads and yet it is the dominant mode of transport.  
Road as a mode of transport accounts for over 80 percent of the volume of freight and 
human movement (Figure 2), but driving from Kampala to Busia and Malaba borders, 
highlights the dilapidated state of the roads network.   
 
Figure 11.  Share of export and imports by modes of transport (%), 2005 
  
Source: Based on UBOS data 
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“Police check points have become ‘police-cash-points’ as they are no longer serving their 
intended purpose of security control only but are using them as mediums of soliciting 
money from transit trailer trucks, especially those with foreign registration numbers”, said 
one irritated transporter.  
Yet these are not the only noted cases of corruption – officials at customs are also alleged 
with corrupt practices by the business sector. 
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Poor road networks in Uganda explain why it has the second highest transportation cost (after 
Ethiopia) for a landlocked African country (Figure 3). The contrast is more glaring when 
compared with exporting countries in Asia. High inland freight charges from Mombasa 
remains a major obstacle to trade. It is easy to understand why stakeholders would compare 
the costs of international shipment with that of transporting goods from port to Kampala.  
Land transport costs are high mainly because less expensive railway transportation 
capacity is not presently available to cater for traffic demand. The railway network has 
virtually collapsed. Only 2 lines are functional (Kampala-Malaba and Tororo-Soroti line – 
commissioned in July 2004), yet it is the cheapest means of transport for cargo. Railways 
currently handle less than 30 percent of Uganda’s bulk cargo to and from the ports of 
Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam. An efficient railway system will reduce the costs of doing 
business and improve the competitiveness of products in the landlocked countries of the 
region. 
 
Figure 12. Freight transport rates of selected countries (%), 1999–2003  
 
 Source: World Bank (derived from IMF data) 
 
In fact, if the report that some Uganda manufacturers were contemplating shifting bases to 
Kenya to reduce transport costs is true, this would have serious ramification on Uganda’s 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
Kenya Uganda Tanzania Ethiopia Ghana Malawi South
Africa
China Thailand Bangladesh Kazakhstan Mongolia Indonesia Philippines
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 49 
Industrial base in the long run. To say the least, it can frustrate the country’s efforts to 
industrialisation.   
They would argue that it is cheaper (it costs only US$2,000) to transport goods from 
China to Mombasa than transporting goods from Mombasa to Kampala (about US$3,000), 
but it is still important to bear in mind that the mode of transport is different. Transport by 
roads, world over is more expensive than transport by sea. It is no surprise that it costs almost 
the same amount to transport a container from Mombasa to Kampala as transporting it from 
Europe to Mombasa port. It is however, true that numerous inland charges such as transit 
fees, licenses, road tolls, levies on goods in excess of the axle limits, container fees, etc 
exaggerates the costs of transport of cargos to destinations such as Uganda and other 
countries that use the Northern Corridor. 
In the 2008/09 budget, Government has promised to invest over the medium term in 
building the Northern Transport Corridor into a dual carriageway, from Busia/Malaba to 
Mbarara (GoU, 2008). Another specific road that is receiving attention is the Kapchorwa-
Bukwa; and Kapchorwa-Suam link near Mount Elgon that would be used by the horticulture 
export industry seeking to develop new farms to grow high value products.13  A regional link 
is also planned to upgrade this road and extend it to Kenya.  Further, the Mount Elgon area 
has some tourism traffic and the regional road could provide an alternative connection from 
Mombasa to the Northwest bypassing Malaba and Tororo. 
With respect to links on the Corridor, there are stretches of the route to Rwanda and DRC 
that need to be upgraded. Plans are underway to link Goma in DRC at Bunagara from 
Kyanika near the Rwanda border, as well as the main link from Mbarara to Katuna.   Also, 
growing trade with Southern Sudan has led to growth of traffic14 on road links with Sudan 
and these are to be upgraded.  Work is underway to provide a standard road to the Sudan 
border from Gulu, and a good standard road all the way from Kampala and Tororo.   
 
3.2 The Central Corridor   
The Central Corridor comprises a network of road, rail and lake transport routes from the port 
of Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma and Mwanza in Tanzania, onwards to Port Bell in Uganda. The 
                                                 
13 From Kapchorwa there is a good road to Mbale and Iganga Thereafter this meets the main Northern corridor to 
Kampala and Entebbe for air transportation. The upgrading of the latter section is ongoing.  
14 Particularly on the road to Oraba (which connects to Yei and Rumbek/Juba, and has very little insurgency on it 
affecting traffic) the most recent traffic count indicated a high Average Daily Traffic (ADT) of 784 without two 
wheelers. 
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transit corridor connects to Bujumbura by ships and barges at Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika 
and then to Rwanda by road. The complete roads network stretches from Dar-es-Salaam via 
Dodoma to Singida, Nzega, Lushaunga – into Rwanda and Burundi.  
As mentioned earlier, less than 15 percent of total goods trade (from and to Uganda) is 
through the Central Corridor (sometimes associated with traders in Masaka), but it also 
provides a viable option for the landlocked countries of Central Africa as a transit route. 
These countries established an intergovernmental standing coordination (about ten years ago) 
to oversee the facilitation of transit transport along the corridor. The committee was to 
oversee the refurbishment of the Ishaka dry port to handle increased cargo from the port of 
Dar-es-Salaam for the hinterland countries. Due to lack of documentation, it has not been 
possible to give clear milestones in terms of achievement from the work of this committee.    
Information from the interviews, points to three major problems that are typical to this 
route: high transport cost associated with long distance and poor road infrastructure (a long 
section of the road is not paved); lower axle load limit than the Northern Corridor’s;  and low 
off take. The Ishaka inland container freight station was meant to ease cargo off take from 
Dar-es-Salaam into the hinterland to Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, but challenges remain. Although the Northern Corridor has its shortcomings as 
mentioned earlier, it remains the preferred route. 
In the 2008/09 budget, Government has promised to develop an alternative route through 
the port of Dar-es-Salaam by rehabilitating wagon-ferries on Lake Victoria. Resources have 
also been located for the purchase of a new ferry wagon to replace the MV Kabalega, which 
sank in 2004. Government is also considering developing the Tanga–Moshi–Arusha–
Shinyanga rail link to operationalise further alternatives for access to the sea (GoU, 2008). 
 
3.2.1 Immigration procedures and visa fees   
Stake holders have complained about cumbersome and duplicated immigration procedures 
and the issue of visa by the EAC partner states. For instance, Tanzania charges visa fees 
contrary to the EA community customs protocol. At the border post of Kenya and Tanzania 
(Nyamanga) each truck that passes is charged $50. Tanzania also charges $100 as work 
permits for those who would like to exhibit their work/products in Tanzania. 
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Visa requirement is among some of the barriers that have already been removed – following 
EAC Council decision, but continued enforcement at Tanzania border posts is causing a lot 
of frustration to transporters. Visa fees were removed in June 2007 and replaced by 
temporary work permits for visitors seeking temporary assignments. These levies do not 
apply to traders, transporters and visitors who are not seeking temporary employment. On the 
contrary, Tanzania, continues to charge visa fees on every truck entering the country.   
 
3.2.2 Variations in axle load limits   
Axle limits vary between Uganda and Tanzania. Tanzania has an axle load limit of 3 
axles per truck, whereas Uganda’s axle limit is 4. Ugandan trucks, therefore, have to remove 
the 4th axle when in Tanzania, an activity which is very costly both in terms of time and 
money. During the political crisis in Kenya, Tanzania authority invited Uganda to use their 
ports, but it became impossible to continue using Tanzania route even for two weeks because 
of the huge fines charged by Tanzania on loads in excess of the standard axle load. The load 
limit is 7 tonnes per axle. It is a problem when the truck has a higher load capacity. Fuel 
prices are increasing as well as maintenance costs. Ultimately, costs of operation go up. 
 
3.2.3 Delays in offloading and clearing cargo at Dar-es-Salaam   
It takes 2–4 weeks to clear containers. In September 2005, there were about 11,000 
containers, which after 4 weeks were not cleared. Yet, they incur demurrages after 15 days.  
 
3.3 Comparative transport costs along transit routes   
In 2004 the WTO estimated that the share of transport costs in value of trade for most Sub-
Saharan African countries is five times greater than actual duties paid. Increase in transport 
costs of 10 percent was estimated to result in 20 percent reduction in trade, which suggests 
that the cost of transport has direct correlation with country trade performance. 
The data in Table 10 (compiled by United Nations Economic Commission for Africa – 
UNECA) indicates that unit transport cost of container is higher for the Central Corridor than 
for the Northern Corridor, which confirms why Northern Corridor is often a preferred route. 
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It is about two times cheaper to transport container through the Maputo corridor than either 
the Central or Northern Corridor. East Africa suffers from poor infrastructure e.g. less than 
30 percent of roads are paved. Administration problems such as check points, delayed 
movement of trucks (transport), standards requirements, and lack of harmonised transport 
systems, customs procedures compound the problem (it takes an average of 12 days to clear 
customs in SSA, compared to 7 days in Latin America, and 5.5 days in Asia).  
 
Table 24. Estimated unit transport costs for container 
 
Route Distance in km Cost per km (US$)  
Dar-es-Salaam-Kigali 1650 3.0  
Dar-es-Salaam-Bujumbura  1750 3.0  
Doala-D’Jamena 1900 4.2  
Lome-Ouagadougou 1000 2.6  
Lome-Niamey 1234 2.6  
Mombasa-Kampala 1440 2.3  
Maputo-Johannesburg 561 1.4  
 
Source: Pearson, Mark (2006) based on United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) data.  
 
 
The main transport and trade facilitation issues on the Northern Corridor are the time spent in 
Mombasa Port by imports and the cost of customs bonds for transit import and export 
cargoes. Also, the poor performance of rail transport necessitates intensive use of higher cost 
road services, which exceed rail rates by 38 to 56 percent (according to World Bank, 2006 
estimates).  Rail services are poor on the Central Corridor too, increasing the time container 
spend at Dar es Salaam Port. 15  Customs bonds and long distance add to costs.  As a result, 
Mombasa, continues to be the main port handling the majority of Uganda’s trade despite the 
recent efficiency improvements at the Dar port with the concessioning of the container 
terminal (port charges are broadly similar for the two ports). Export cargoes meeting shipping 
deadlines do not face delays in either port but incur costs related to customs bonds. 
 
                                                 
15 Unlike the Northern Corridor the availability of road services is limited.  
 53 
4 Other non-tariff barriers to goods trade  
 
4.1 Arbitrary use of Rules of Origin 
Customs procedures are complicated by differences in the interpretation of the Rules of 
Origin. Rules of origin are the criteria used to define where a product was made. Under the 
WTO Agreement, members are required to ensure that their rules of origin are transparent, 
and do not have restricting, distorting or disruptive effects on international trade. They must 
also be administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, and based on 
a positive standard.16 
What is happening in EAC is that Rules of Origin only apply when an import is wholly 
produced in that country. Where there has been any transformation on the product, the 
tendency is to use the COMESA rules of origin. At that point, controversy comes, in the 
interpretation. This problem will last as long as the five EAC members do not standardise 
certificates of origin. At the moment there is no clear consensus on this matter. Uganda 
prefers to argue that ‘local content of local  raw material should exceed 35 percent of the ex-
factory cost and the product should be classified in a separate tariff heading other than the 
non-originating raw materials used in production.’ Others disagree. 
The internal bureaucratic problems have not gone away either. Certification from Uganda 
Exports Promotion Board (that the goods are from Uganda) takes more than a week. 
Obviously, this bureaucratic delay greatly affects exporters especially those dealing in 
perishable products. 
 
4.2 Business registration and licensing procedures   
Varying business procedures and treatment of EAC originating businesses as foreign 
businesses makes cross-border registration of business branches difficult and cumbersome. 
Payment for registration of business names and the multiplicity of licenses among the five 
EAC countries for production, distribution or sale of goods result in high costs of licensing.  
                                                 
16 Countries setting up a free trade area are allowed to use different rules of origin for products traded under their free 
trade agreement. The agreement establishes a harmonization work programme, based upon a set of principles, including 
making rules of origin objective, understandable and predictable. 
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The WTO Trade Related Property Rights Agreement exempts developing countries from 
certain obligations which four of the five EAC Member states would enjoy. All the East 
African countries, apart from Kenya, are categorized as Least Developed Countries. When it 
comes to cross border trade of pharmaceutical and medicinal products, it becomes very 
complicated about the manner in which the four LDCs in EAC should trade with Kenya. 
   
4.3 Import and export bans  
Heightened concerns over food safety and potential impact of non-compliance with SPS 
standards following the EC fish trade restrictions by the end of the 1990s have resulted in 
stringent measures by EAC Member States. In Uganda, government departments have sought 
to increase budgetary resources to carry out regulatory enforcement, and awareness of the 
importance of food safety and agricultural health issues has spread into other industries, 
particularly at the level of food processors. 
In the livestock sector, SPS problems are a major barrier to trade due to the presence of 
endemic diseases. In August, 2007, Kenya and neighbouring countries imposed trade 
restrictions (a ban) on Ugandan poultry as a result of concerns over a suspected case of 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (bird flu). Kenya demanded that a test for bird flu be 
conducted first, the test was conducted successfully and non existent of bird flue confirmed, 
but the ban has not been lifted up to today. 
While importation of day-old chicks are permitted into Uganda, this is not so in Kenya 
and Tanzania. Rwanda usually imposes bans on the export of beans when it suspects 
supply shortage. These bans are very unpredictable in nature thus making it hard for 
Ugandan importers to plan appropriately. While others impose trade restrictions on 
Ugandan products, Ugandan markets remain open to imports from its neighbours. These 
restrictions have negative impacts on income generated by the livestock sector and 
directly impact on poverty and food security for the poor farmers reliant on livestock 
production.  
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4.4 Inspection for standards / compliance with SPS requirements  
A number of barriers identified were, by nature, technical barriers to trade which result, 
either directly or indirectly, from the requirement to comply with compulsory/mandatory 
standards, mainly in the area of food safety, animal and plant health (i.e. sanitary and 
phytosanitary or SPS) requirements. 
There are two challenges to be tackled, fostering the development of sustainable 
SPS/quality management capacities (to reduce potential risks of market access problems 
related to some of its more important exports to regional markets and outside the region) and 
issue of harmonisation of standards.  
Enormous amount of development assistance has gone towards promoting Uganda’s agro-
food exports, but with modest success in fostering the development of sustainable 
SPS/quality management capacities.  Based on Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) 
Action Plan and other capacity assessment and evaluations, and recently concluded workshop 
on mobilising aid for SPS-related technical cooperation in East Africa, a number of priority 
areas have been suggested in the SPS area. However, the proposed interventions are too 
broad and are not focused enough to create any impact. 
Attention should now be focused on (i) prioritizing investments to specific SPS 
compliance issues and related capacity-building needs; (ii) awareness-raising and promotion 
of good practices among primary producers, enterprises and capacity of regulatory agents; 
(iii) clearly  defining the roles and responsibilities of different players; and (iv) strengthening 
institutional collaboration—within the private and public sector agencies, and among 
donors—in the implementation of agreed strategies and programs. 
The EAC protocol required harmonisation of standards across the region but the 
realisation of this has not been forthcoming. The failure to harmonise standards has resulted 
in a situation where individual member states has continued to set their own standards, 
requiring the other states to comply, thus hindering cross border trade in the region. A 
Tanzanian food exporter pays Tsh200,000 (each time) for a Tanzania Bureau of Standards’ 
certificate, but in the end the certificate is not recognized by the other EAC countries.  
It is the mandate of the National Bureau of Standards to ensure that producers meet 
required industrial standards. It is also true that all EAC member states are required to 
recognise each others quality marks as stated before. However, due to inadequate capacity in 
standards/quality management, there has been miss-application or miss-interpretation of 
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standards with regard to the requirements/certification. Think about a sugar-producing 
factory that was set up around the Kagera Basin in Tanzania to manufacture brown sugar. 
The sugar produced from this factory bears the certification of Tanzania’s Bureau of 
Standard and is being exported into Uganda.  
In Uganda the sugar is sold at a price lower than the Uganda-produced sugar. The problem 
is that the existing standard in Uganda does not apply to brown sugar. While Tanzania sugar 
in this case, meets the certification requirements, it doesn’t meet the standards requirement in 
Uganda.  
Government admits that this (harmonisation of standards/monitoring the adoption and 
implementation of standards) is an area that has proved difficult to implement because of 
limited resources and capacity. Just to obtain samples from producers or manufacturers in the 
country by the national standards agencies (National Bureaus of Standards) for testing to 
ensure conformity to standards has not been possible. It has not been possible due to the high 
cost involved and limited capacity of the national agencies responsible for enforcement of 
standards such as the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS). This requires 
investments and technical assistance. At the moment, consumers may not have confidence 
that all products in the market are up to standards.  
The issue of accreditation of laboratories to perform required tests also presents a 
technical barrier. Accreditation takes into account the general laboratory environment (which 
is really based on subjective judgement), competence of the personnel involved in the testing 
of products, the procedures followed in performing the tests, validation of the tests by 
performing the same tests on standard products and comparing the results. These 
competences are not the same in all countries. Rwanda for example, is facing accreditation 
problem of its laboratories due to insufficient competence to perform the required tests. 
Yet, political will still counts. Compliance to industrial standards can prove impossible to 
implement especially if it is viewed as conflicting with the political agenda of promoting 
industrialisation. This has been the case, but it does not help in the long run. The credibility 
of the bureau of standards continues to be in doubt – affecting trade in the region. This effect 
has in the past, been down played by mutual understanding and a good track record that some 
of these standards agencies (e.g. UNBS) have built over time. The issue is now being looked 
into. 
Of great importance also is the inspection systems used for goods traded across borders. 
These have to ensure that international standards are followed (and yet access to international 
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standards on some products, especially those used by terrorists such as chemicals, are 
currently very difficult), accepted procedures followed, and that accepted sample sizes are 
used such that the test results obtained are unbiased. These are not in harmony and there are 
instances where goods are returned or destroyed due to this variation (lack of 
standardisation). Again, this is an area where technical assistance is very vital. 
The national bureau of standards are not equipped enough to ensure that the local 
industries meet the international standards and therefore able to compete in the international 
markets. International standards require confidence in the measurement of industry 
equipment. For instance, in the manufacture of cement, if a certain amount of cement is put 
in the kiln and is burnt at 1000oC for 3 seconds, how sure are we that the temperature was 
actually at 1000oC? Otherwise, if the temperature were different, it would be very disastrous. 
This confidence is obtained from tests carried out to ensure that the equipment the industry is 
using is up to standard. Industries that do not have their equipments tested are therefore 
restricted on how far they can trade, and consequently how much they can sell. 
 
Other constraints  
Information constraint 
Dissemination of information is poor. Traders are not aware of some of the decisions made at 
the EAC Council, decisions like the new transit regulations we mentioned in our earlier 
discussion. This and other related information barriers can be a major hindrance to regional 
integration.  
Insecurity/highway crimes 
Heightened security concerns along the route (mainly to combat counterfeits and smuggling) 
and highway thefts have resulted in additional concerns for traders and transporters along the 
Northern Corridor. There is a big problem of loss of containers on the way to Uganda/ Kampala, 
last year 32 containers were lost to thieves and a number of people lost their lives. Furthermore 
the events that unfolded after the December disputed election in Kenya led to one of the 
worst highway crimes ever witnessed in Kenyan history.   
Influx of counterfeits products   
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There is a lot of mushrooming trade in counterfeit and adulterated products across the border. 
The sale of these products unfairly competes with the legitimate industry but more 
importantly adds unnecessary risk for the users. The regulatory authority does not have 
adequate resources (both financial and human resources) to curb the problem of counterfeits 
practices. It is only recently that the parliament passed a bill to deal with the problem of 
counterfeits.   
In 2004, about 50 tonnes of counterfeit goods were impounded by the Uganda National 
Bureau of Standards (UNBS) because they failed to meet the minimum quality standards. 
These included foodstuffs, soft drinks, salt, cosmetics, clothes, building materials such as 
cement, and factory goods. According to officials at UNBS, counterfeit goods worth over Shs 
600 million were either denied market in Uganda (returned) or destroyed by inspection units 
at various border points. Other affected products are pens (e.g. the case between Mulwana 
and Picfare), tiger head battery, textiles, and foam products (e.g. the case between Euro foam 
and Vita Foam), tooth brush (case between Mulwana ship toothbrush and another firm that 
produced the same from a German factory).  
 
Smuggling  
Serious concern has been expressed about cross-border illicit trade. The most serious form of 
illicit trade activities across the borders is smuggling. A large part of this trade comprises day-
to-day transactions between traders living in locations on either side of the national borders. 
Most commodities crossing borders are absorbed by the local markets along the border – 
usually delivered on bicycles and heads, and hands in ‘caveras’ (polythane bags) normally in 
small quantities. Identifying cross-border illicit traders of this nature is not so straightforward 
because they could easily be mistaken for goods for own personal use or gift from relatives. 
Besides, the region’s borders are inherited from a colonial era that split entire communities who 
shared historical trading, family and cultural links, which makes these small-scale types of 
transactions to attract less attention. 
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5 Efforts to eliminate NTBs and challenges   
 
A lot has been done with assistance of donor community especially the World Bank, over the 
last ten years, in an effort to address myriad challenges associated with goods trade through 
the Northern Transit Corridor. For instance, the East African Trade and Transportation 
Facilitation Project (EATFP) that was established a few years ago, with financial support of 
the World Bank is among the initiatives that were expected to bring about reduction in transit 
times (and hence costs) along the Northern Corridor. The project was meant to improve the 
movement and clearance of goods along the corridor and facilitate the implementation of the 
East African Customs Union. Several of the project components were geared towards the 
enhancement of cargo clearance and delivery. 
As part of EATFP initiative, a number of border posts along the northern corridor were to 
be improved to facilitate joint controls and one-stop border operations. It was also intended to 
support implementation of port community systems, enhancement of port security and the 
concessioning of the Kenya – Uganda railways. There is need to document the achievements 
and challenges of this project, so as to enrich the recommendations of elimination of the 
NTBs.  
With further assistance of the World Bank sub-Saharan transport policy and Programme, 
the Northern Corridor established an observatory of non-tariff barriers and performance 
indicators. In order to address these barriers, the TTCA secretariat was supposed to set up a 
continuous monitoring of delays through agreed mechanisms with transportation association 
in the region. TTCA was supposed to monitor a wide range of operations along the route, 
from handling and clearance at the port and movement of goods along the transit route to 
customs clearance operations both in transit and at the final destination. 
With regard to one – stop border posts, Kenya and Uganda had concluded a bilateral 
agreement, which provides the necessary legal framework for joint controls at their common 
border posts. The two countries have also agreed to take immediate steps towards the 
introduction of 24-hour services at their common border posts. It would appear that the 
directive by the minister of roads and public works in Kenya, to the effect that transit trucks 
be weighed once and issued with certificates, has not been fully complied with. 
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What are the real obstacles?  
 
Stakeholders feel that success in elimination of NTBs can be expected to be more difficult for 
EAC, than was the case for tariff reductions. They associate this with the complex nature of 
the NTBs, the political will to tackle the problem, inadequate technical capacity across the 
partner states, the financial dependence at the national level, etc. A more detailed analysis of 
each of these issues follows. 
 
Delayed decisions due to failure of Council to meet 
  
Major decisions are made by the council of ministers of all the member states, but as 
stakeholders pointed out they do not meet regularly. As a result, policy decisions that should 
have been taken at the regional level get delayed. Nothing gets done because member 
countries cannot take unilateral decisions before resolutions are made by the council of 
ministers. This delays the implementation of important strategies that could improve trade in 
the region. 
 
Delayed implementation / harmonisation of policies and issues    
 
Stakeholders interviewed feel that all issues agreed upon by member states should be 
harmonised and given similar treatment although this has not the case. The laws or policies 
governing trade within the EA Community have not been harmonised to cater for the needs 
of all member countries.  For instance, in the 2007/08 budget, Government (Uganda) 
imposed a ban on production and importation of polythene bags less than 30 microns, but 
Kenya government did not. Kenya continues to produce and export to Uganda polythene bags 
less than 30 microns – through unofficial routes (smuggling). Stakeholders have 
recommended that, for purpose of harmony, all the partner states need to devise a mechanism 
to restrain domestic players from undermining regulations that are put in place by other 
partner states. The same story of the polythene bags is heard in Rwanda. In Rwanda it is 
illegal to use polythene bags of whatever microns although the regulation in Uganda permits 
use of polythene bags of a thickness of 30 or more microns. Uganda can not, therefore, 
export products to Rwanda, which require such material for packaging. 
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With regards to standards, regulatory systems are different in the different member states.  
 
Stakeholder feel that what is and might continue to make harmonization more difficult is the 
problem of multiple memberships in the regional trade arrangements. This will retard the 
integration process and delay the gains of EAC customs union. Think of Uganda and Kenya 
being members of the COMESA, with Kenya belonging to COMESA free trade area, Uganda 
not; and Tanzania not being part of COMESA, but belonging SADC.  
  
Compliance with EAC system, lack of commitment, failure to implement council decisions 
 
There is a general belief that implementing agents from partner states still think in terms of 
their individual countries and not in terms of East African Community – including those 
working at customs and ports. As a result, they tend to favour their own citizens than others. 
We learnt that although agreement was reached on elimination of NTBs, its enforcement has 
been very poor. Part of the reason, according to some stakeholders, is that the EAC 
Secretariat lacks sufficient powers to penalise non-compliant members, so it ends up playing 
a role that stakeholder equates to that of an observer’s. 
Some stakeholders think that the ‘go-slow’ policy are designed by some states, in what 
they called ‘a trade-game’ because there are countries are benefiting this (delay in 
eliminating NTBs).  
In September 2007, all member states of the EA community met in Arusha to discuss 
NTBs and how they can be eliminated. Resolutions were made. Among them was the 
development of the NTB mechanism that should guide the elimination of the trade barriers. 
National committees were formed, and charged with the responsibility of ensuring the 
implementation of the NTB monitoring mechanism. However, the Ugandan committee has 
never met at all. Therefore, the NTB monitoring mechanism is not working in Uganda. This 
has obviously, frustrated the efforts to eliminate the non tariff barriers. There is also a feeling 
that keeping the NTBs is deliberate and is being used as alternative to tariffs to avoid 
competition.  
Furthermore, in the EAC meeting in Arusha about the NTBs, it was agreed that all drivers 
should have NTB sport and patch forms. The drivers are supposed to record all the barriers 
they face on the road. This form should then be submitted to the Ministry of Trade, Tourism 
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and Industry for review, and then forwarded to the EAC Secretariat for redress. All this has 
not been implemented at all because the Uganda committee is not functional. The frame work 
of the implementation of NTB mechanism is not working and its progress is not being 
monitored and evaluated. The people supposed to ensure the implementation of this 
mechanism are not yet acting on it and this has caused delay. Lack of commitment on the part 
of governments was often cited, by both the private sector and officials in government 
ministries – in what they described as deliberate intentions by member countries to protect 
the interests of their countries in trade. Government agencies (e.g. revenue authorities, police, 
etc) both in Uganda and in the region have not been fully sensitised and oriented to 
effectively play their role in implementing directives and agreements geared towards 
eliminating NTBs.  
  
Poor flow of information 
 
Article X of GATT requires that: laws, regulations and other information (including on cross-
border procedures and customs administration) that affect or relate to importing and 
exporting must be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders 
to familiarize themselves with them.  
In some of our meetings with officials of traders association, Government was criticised 
for keeping traders ignorant. That majority of the traders do not even know that there is an 
NTB monitoring mechanism through which they can report barriers. There is apparently an 
information gap between the policy makers, implementing agencies like National Bureaus of 
standards and the traders. Even the mechanism and language used to explain issues 
concerning trade in the EAC are not simplified enough to benefit traders. 
How about the public? We were reminded that majority of the people do no know about 
EAC and what it is supposed to achieve. Stakeholders feel that unless people are made aware 
and sensitised about EAC integration process, they will be reluctant to endorse certain 
strategies that may be decided upon.  
Whereas awareness at the senior regional level is high, public participation in the EAC 
partner states is still limited. Thus, broadening and deepening ownership among East Africa 
citizens remains a big challenge. This can be achieved by improved information sharing, the 
adoption of new methodologies for networking among stakeholders. The challenge is for 
EAC Member States to be as successful in energising mobilisation and implementation as it 
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has been in reviving the community. A change would concern defining a framework to 
ensure more effective interaction between the EAC Secretariat and different stakeholders.   
 
Institutionalisation problem at the EAC  
Some stakeholders interviewed were not satisfied with the pace of development at the EAC 
Secretariat with regards to Arbitration process. That whenever they face problem, the process 
of getting justice is so slow that some problems are never solved. This is a source of 
frustration for many traders. Traders also feel that EAC lacks policy on how business people 
who have incurred losses (due to political conflicts, etc. such as the recent case in Kenya) can 
be compensated. 
 
Weak capacity of national institutions 
The regional structure is not adequate. The Bureaus of Standard are not sufficiently staffed; 
more staff with the right skills are required to implement the harmonisation process. Apart 
from the senior staffs of the National Bureaus of Standard, who are already actively 
participating in the East African Commission, the junior staffs are slow in realising that what 
they do here locally actually has a regional impact. They need to be sensitised, and this 
should be the responsibility of the Bureau of Standard as an institution.  
Cultures of the regulatory bodies are different and institutional frameworks are ineffective 
with regard to developing standards and harmonisation of standards. The harmonisation 
process is being driven by the public sector. The private sector, who are the ones actually 
affected by the process, are not involved.  
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6 Summary, conclusions and recommendations   
 
Summary 
The study analysed the existing non-tariff barriers to trade in goods within the East African 
Community. The northern corridor has tried to sustain its traditional role as the main route for 
Uganda’s overseas imports and exports and as the life line of the Great Lakes region - 
accounting for over 80 percent of the cargo (exports/imports) - by road to the landlocked 
countries. However, a number of non-tariff barriers exist along this route (and so, along the 
Central Corridor) which are impediments to free flow of goods trade within the region. 
Among the critical NTBs are delays at port (port procedures), multiple transit fees, 
customs documentation (bureaucratic border post/customs procedures), restricted axle load 
limits and too many weigh bridges (leading to unnecessary delays), import and export 
inspection and certification procedures, police road blocks, Arbitrary use of Rules of Origin, 
arbitrary interpretation of standards and SPS requirements, and infrastructure constraints.17 
Other barriers that are relatively less severe than the ones mentioned above are problems 
related to bribery and corruption, business registration and licensing procedures, import and 
export bans, congestion of trucks at the port and poor flow or dissemination of policy 
information. 
The study found that port procedures (at Mombasa) take over 60 hours – i.e. about two 
weeks in most cases, to have goods cleared by Kenya Port Authority, followed by border post 
procedures that take 15 hours. It takes seven days to transport goods from Mombasa to the 
Kenya-Uganda Malaba border-post. Without barriers along the route, it should take 3-4 days. 
This finding is consistent with other studies e.g. the World Bank (2006) which found that 
transit cargo spent (on average) 17.9 days in Mombasa port in October 2005.  The study 
estimate the reasonable time for stay at port to be 7 days instead of two weeks (or more) for 
cargo at Mombasa destined for Uganda.  
                                                 
17 Prioritization of different NTBs identified was based the responses received from stakeholders. 
Stakeholders were asked to list the first three to four most important NTBs based on their experiences, and 
identify others that never affected their businesses in a significant way. Stakeholders used a number of 
parameters such as transaction time, and costs, indirect business loss, etc. to arrive at their decisions. Using 
frequency, the most mentioned NTBs were considered as critical.   
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These non-tariff barriers coupled with poor infrastructure, and corruption, all add to the 
difficulty and cost of trading. These, together with the already high transport costs on the 
route, result in Uganda, a land-locked country, failing to compete. 
The instruments under the EAC Customs Union protocol have not been fully successful in 
reducing the transit barriers along the transit routes, such as delays and high transaction costs 
created by bureaucratic customs procedures, restricted axle load limits and too many weigh 
bridges, multiple fees and formalities for exports and imports, police roadblocks, etc.   
Although consensus exist on elimination of most of the NTBs, their implementation poses 
serious challenges due to rigidities in government management at transit points, lack of 
political commitment, delayed decisions due to failure of Council to meet, failure to 
implement council decisions due to rigidity of implementing agencies to change, delay to 
harmonise cross-border policies and procedures, and to standardise regulatory systems and 
instruments.      
Table 11 selects the NTBs that are critical to trade in EAC. The information summarised 
in Table 11 show that at least 40 percent of the current non-tariff barriers exist because 
governments (or government agencies) have delayed to implement decisions/resolutions 
made by council of ministers, or provision in the EAC Protocol to eliminate them, or 
directives by responsible ministers. These types of NTBs are classified as category 1 NTBs in 
the table. 
The second category of the NTBs (category 2 NTBs), which accounts for about 50 percent 
of the total number of NTBs, arise from policy differences or lack of cross border 
harmonisation and standardisation of procedures and regulations. This category of NTBs 
requires building consensus. Benchmarking the EAC and national development of 
harmonised and simplified clearance and transit procedures and standards will require 
technical assistance and capacity building. Category 3 type of NTBs shall need long term 
intervention.  
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Table 25. Major non-tariff barriers in EAC 
 
 
Selected EAC 
reported NTBs 
Causes 
Solution agreed, but not 
implemented 
Category 
1 Import and export 
inspection and 
certification 
procedures  
 
Failure to implement EAC 
harmonized standards adopted 
by EAC Partner States - to 
ensure mutual recognition of 
national quality marks on 
products by national standard 
agencies; many agents involved 
in certification. 
The mechanism agreed by the 
Partner States exempt the 
goods from vigorous verification 
upon importation once they bear 
the quality marks. 
  
1 
2 
Delays in clearing 
goods at port and 
customs 
Limited customs opening hours / 
failure to implement decisions to 
introduce 24 hour service 
Uganda and Kenya agreed to 
introduce 24 - hour service at 
common border posts. 
2 
3 
Inspection for 
standards 
(Incompatible 
standards) 
Miss-application/ interpretation of 
standards with regards to 
certification, due to failure to 
implement EAC decision  
EAC Protocol requires 
harmonization of standards 
 
1 
4 Delays in offloading 
  
Low off take capacity, limited 
facility   
3 
5 Variation in transit 
good license fees 
Lack of standardization of transit 
license fees    
2 
6 Multiple transit fees 
Lack of standardization of transit 
fees  
 2 
7 
Lengthy customs 
procedures and 
documentation 
Lack of harmonization of 
customs procedures and 
documentation   
2 
8 
Arbitrary use of 
Rules of Origin 
 
Problem of interpretation and 
failure to standardize certificate 
or origin   
2 
9 Varying system of 
import declaration 
Failure to standardize certificate 
or origin   
2 
10 
Restricted/varying 
axle load limits 
Lack of harmonization of 
standard axle load limits 
 1 
11 
Delays at 
weighbridges 
  
Too many weighbridges, 
acceptable weights not 
harmonized 
The Kenyan Minister of Roads 
and Public Works directed that 
transit goods be weighed once 
and issued with certificates 
1 
12 
Delays at police 
roadblocks     
2 
 
 
General conclusions and recommendations 
 
As mentioned earlier, the NTBs that are of priority concerns to Uganda include: delays at 
port or port procedures (category 2), multiple transit fees (category 2), customs 
documentation or bureaucratic border post/customs procedures (category 2), restricted axle 
load limits and too many weigh bridges – leading to unnecessary delays (category 2), import 
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and export inspection and certification procedures (category 1), police road blocks (category 
2), Arbitrary use of Rules of Origin (category 2), arbitrary interpretation of standards and 
SPS requirements (category 1), and infrastructure constraints (category 3). 
Challenges ranging from estimating the extent of constraint imposed on trade flows by the 
individual NTBs to political and economic factors make targeting (NTB elimination) 
difficult. Nonetheless, all NTBs identified under category 1 may well be the low hanging 
fruits that EAC may wish to target first. Targeting the barriers listed under category 2 can 
then follow (it may under special circumstances be targeted simultaneously with those in 
category 1), even though significant time and effort would be needed to devise and 
implement a plan for their removal. 
Revised Kyoto Convention widely used as the basis for benchmarking the regional and 
national development of harmonised and simplified clearance and transit procedures and 
standards. Various instruments such as Single Administrative Documents (SADs), Time 
Release studies, the WCO Diagnostic and the WCO data model have been developed to 
enhance this process. 
 
Specific recommendations 
 
One Stop Border Posts – shall reduce the time taken at borders, thus reducing transit costs. 
This should be accompanied by sharing of data and computerisation of the services or 
operation of other border posts. A system of network, which could link all the revenue 
authorities in the EAC would enhance information sharing and efficiency, and reduce delays 
at customs and costs of documentation. 
  
Carriers License – transit goods license should allow back-loads. This will reduce cost of 
transport 
 
Axle Load Limits and Vehicle Dimensions – Need to allow trucks to operate with the same 
axle loads through-out the region 
 
NTB Monitoring System – Need to track non-tariff barriers, which are moving target, 
eliminate those that are genuine NTBs and try to limit appearance of new ones. 
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Harmonised Standards and SPS – It is difficult to have trade between countries of the 
standards and health and phytosanitary regulations incompatible. Harmonisation of standards 
should be one of the priorities. A sector level approach in development of standards (and in 
building consensus) is recommended, involving relevant stakeholders such as commodity 
associations.  
Attention should focus on (i) specific SPS compliance issues and related capacity-building 
needs; (ii) awareness-raising and promotion of good practices among primary producers, 
enterprises and capacity of regulatory agents; (iii) clearly defining the roles and 
responsibilities of different players; and (iv) strengthening institutional collaboration—within 
the private and public sector agencies, and among donors—in the implementation of agreed 
strategies and programs. SPS Priority needs for Uganda (that emerged from recent workshop 
are provided in Appendix 2) 
Improve infrastructure – Need for joint/regional projects to improve infrastructure 
especially roads network and providing vessels on Lake Victoria to ease transport. An 
efficient railway system will reduce the costs of doing business and improve the 
competitiveness of products in the landlocked countries of the region. There is need to regulate rail 
service provider to prevent inefficiency and abuse of market power in niches that railways could 
dominate (such as container traffic); and repair the ships/ferries that operate on Lake Victoria.  
Applying principle of asymmetry – Provide differential treatment to countries that are 
relatively more disadvantaged than others (e.g. landlocked countries) when applying transit 
or customs regulations and procedures, etc.  
Stakeholder participation and effective information sharing – Need for effective 
consultation and stakeholders information (including business community) and collective 
decision making. There is also need for a focal point institution (at national level) outside the 
government spheres for effective dissemination of information e.g. on new regulations, or 
resolution and decisions of council, standards, awareness creation, and to update or educate 
stakeholders on progress in the integration. Through the focal point network, effective 
mechanisms for solving problems that traders face while doing business and getting feedback 
can be developed to improve beyond the border relation.  
 69 
References  
Abegaz, M. 2008. “Mobilising Aid for Trade for SPS-Related Technical Cooperation in East 
Africa: SPS Balance Sheet for Uganda”, unpublished report presented at (WTO, World 
Bank, FAO, WHO) – workshop on mobilising aid for trade, Kampala, May 28-29, 2008. 
Ayoki, M. 2007. “Strengthening South – South Cooperation Amongst East African Community 
Member States”,   report prepared for United Nations Development Programme.  
East Africa Business Council (EABC). 2007. East African Community 2006/07 Business 
  Climate Index Survey, Arusha, Tanzania. 
EAC. 1999. Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Customs Union, East 
African Community Secretariat, Arusha. 
East African Transportation Initiative (EATI). 1999. “Enhancing Transport Policy Harmonisation  
in Eastern and Southern Africa Through Dialogue”, Quarterly Newsletter, Third Issue 
November, 1999. 
Hammels, D. 2001. “Time as a Trade Barrier”, Global Trade Analysis Project Working Paper 
Number 18, Purdue University. 
Pearson, M. 2006. “Enhancing African Regional Integration: Trade Policy and Trade 
Facilitation”, presentation to the World Bank Course on Regional Integration in Africa 
and Economic Partnership Agreements, Nairobi, Kenya, 22-24 May 2006 
Raman, V. 2006. “Transport and Trade Facilitation in Uganda,” background paper for the 
Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, the World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
The Republic of Uganda (GoU). 2008. Background to the Budget 2008/09, Achieving Property 
for all Through Infrastructure Development, Enhancing Employment and Economic 
Growth, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Kampala, June 
2008. 
WTO. 2005. Doha Declarations, World Trade Organisation, Geneva.  
World Bank. 2007. “Option for Strengthening East African Community’s Trade Integration”, 
 unpublished report No. 40978–AFR.  
  
 
Appendix 1: Preliminary action plan for eliminating NTBs 
 
 Selected NTBs Action recommended  Responsible agency  Time frame 
1 
Import and export 
inspection and certification 
procedures  
 
Implement EAC harmonized standards adopted by EAC Partner States - to ensure 
mutual recognition of national quality marks on products by national standard 
agencies; reduce the number of agents involved in certification. MTTI (NBS) 
Short term 
2 
Delays in clearing goods at 
port and customs 
Introduce 24 hour service at common border posts; Use regional fora to address 
problem of delays in Ports, including placing emphasis on use of electronic data 
interchange and improved cargo tracking; establish advance shipping information 
system in ASYCUDA++. 
URA and other 
Revenue Authorities in 
EAC 
Short term 
3 
Inspection for standards 
(Incompatible standards) 
Harmonize standards as required by EAC Protocol 
Harmonize selected East Africa regional SPS and quality regulations and 
procedures that will facilitate trade 
Develop accreditation laboratory 
UNBS and other 
Bureaus of Standards 
in EAC 
Short term 
4 Delays at weighbridges 
  
Change regulations to have transit goods weighed once and issued with 
certificates.  
Short term 
5 Delays in offloading at port 
  
Improve off take capacity, and port facility 
   
Medium to 
long term 
6 
Variation in transit good 
license fees Standardize transit license fees    
Medium term 
7 
Lengthy customs 
procedures and 
documentation 
Harmonize customs procedures and documentation; establish advance shipping 
information system in ASYCUDA++; Sensitize business community on import 
procedures and processes.   
Medium term 
8 Arbitrary use of Rules of 
Origin Standardize certificate or origin and build capacity of National Bureau of Standards   
Medium term 
9 Varying system of import 
declaration Standardize certificate or origin   
Medium term 
10 
Delays at police 
roadblocks  Reduce number of police roadblocks   
Medium term 
  
   
  
Appendix 2: SPS Priority needs for Uganda 
 
(Final conclusion from workshop on Mobilizing Aid for Trade for SPS-Related Technical Cooperation 
in East Africa, Kampala, Uganda, 28-29 May 2008) 
 
Details  
Timeframe   
Short term Medium Long term 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SPS POLICY 
1. Stock taking – establishment of existing gaps and Policy development 
following a consultative approach 
 
2. Policy implementation – include regulations development, legal reforms, 
institutional development and rationalisation, awareness creation  
 
3. Training on Pest risk analysis 
 
4. Monitoring & Evaluation- for the SPS policy 
  
<1yr 
X 
 
 
1-2yrs 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
>3-5yrs 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
LIVESTOCK SECTOR 
1. Awareness creation 
 
2. Conformity assessment and establishment of certification system 
 
3. Infrastructure systems  
 
4. Establish disease free zones 
 
5. Cattle movement routes  
 
6. Research on breeding 
 
7. Good Handling Practices (GHP) 
 
8. Capacity building in animal husbandry 
 
9. Traceability 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
ANIMAL DISEASE 
1. Policy enforcement surveillance mechanisms for cross boarder animal 
disease – Regional aspect 
 
2. Awareness creation 
 
3. Proper information flow  
 
4. Strengthening existing control mechanisms  
 
5. Capacity building in risk assessment and mitigation measures for 
quarantining, holding and pest risk analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
FISHERIES 
1. Awareness creation on GHP across the entire chain 
 
2. Improve fish handling  methods and the design of fishing boats for proper 
hygiene  
 
3. Build capacity in Monitoring Control and Surveillance  
 
4. Provision of adequate upstream infrastructure at landing sites 
 
5. Harmonise traceability system regionally 
 
6. Approve other lakes and upgrade the landing sites 
 
7. Infrastructure development in laboratories/accreditation and capacity 
building 
 
8. Strengthening research institutions 
 
9. Development of infrastructure for aquaculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
  
10. Environmental Monitoring programming  
    
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
HORTICULTURE 
 
Creation of awareness amongst the farmers 
 
Creation of export groups/critical mass of small scale exporters  
Standard pack houses 
Training quality controllers 
 
Improvement of the cold chain infrastructure 
Production Marketing Distribution and Transportation infrastructure 
 
Pesticide residue monitoring plan for fruits and vegetables 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
FOOD SAFETY 
Safe water supply and its impact on SPS (water policy) 
Implementation of National Food Safety Strategic Plan 
 
1. Improvement of policy framework for food safety  
 
2. Streamlining institutional responsibility framework 
 
3. Food safety and handling infrastructure including Training of enterprises and 
food inspectors. 
 
4. Certification for enterprises    
 
5. Awareness creation including on the demand side (food safety in education 
system) 
 
6. Development of Codes of Practices (COPs) on good agricultural practices, 
good manufacturing practices and mycotoxine detection in foods, food 
safety management systems 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
CROSS CUTTING ISSUES 
1. Bolstering the enforcement capacity including training of responsible 
enforcement agencies 
 
2. Strengthening of national notification systems/information flow 
 
3. Building capacity for sustained compliance with SPS/sustainability. 
 
4. Awareness of SPS issues by policy makers and politicians  
 
5. Development of Codes of Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
  
Appendix 3: Region (EAC) outstanding priority SPS action areas 
 (Final conclusion from workshop on Mobilizing Aid for Trade for SPS-Related Technical Cooperation in East Africa, Kampala, Uganda, 28-29 May 2008) 
 
Title of action Background Specific details to be covered Timeline 
Further harmonize 
standards in selected 
product areas                    
 
Most "harmonized" standards relate to product 
specifications. Only limited number cover sampling 
and testing methods, labelling or other matters that 
might truly affect trade. Only few "harmonized" 
standards have been formally adopted as national 
standards. In selected product areas, further 
harmonization might be beneficial to trade 
(examples are standards being developed within 
COMESA for maize and dairy products). Private 
sector is best positioned to identify these areas and 
it is thus critical that a stronger demand-driven 
element be introduced in the ongoing process of 
harmonization. 
- Coordination between EAC, COMESA, SADC standardization committees and 
activities 
- RECS two way communication with International Standards Setting 
Organizations (ISSOs) committees – informing member NSBs and bringing new 
items for international standardization regional 
- Representation of RECS in ISSOs, choice of type of membership and funding 
(funding could be secured through various means such as ongoing technical 
assistance, fee-waivers and contribution from regional associations) 
 
 
 
 
Streamline regulations and 
create a system of mutual 
recognition of conformity 
assessments in EAC 
member countries.   
Complementary to the harmonization process is the 
need to establish systems of mutual recognition on 
the implementation side. Systems need not feature 
equivalent capacities, yet over a broad range of 
areas there is scope to introduce common - 
standard-operating - procedures, record-keeping, 
auditing, etc. In addition, unnecessary regulations 
should be eliminated as much as possible. The 
possibility of developing "model" legislation (e.g. a 
basic model food safety law) should also be further 
examined.    
- UNIDO/EAC/NORAD is focusing on the development of the model on food 
safety legislation, but assessment needed for animal and plant health model.  
- Improvement of SPS protocol draft to indicate on what needs to be harmonized 
and its translation for countries without the capabilities to meet the requirements. 
- Ensure no contradiction and mutual support between EAC and COMESA SPS 
protocols 
- Assessment and upgrading of regulations dealing with SPS 
- Encourage member states to have a national SPS committee to be responsible 
for coordinating all SPS issues.  
- Members to be signatories to all SPS conventions. 
 
Create economies of scale 
and cooperation through 
establishment of centers of 
excellence and a regional 
accreditation body 
Different institutions and countries are currently 
duplicating analytical, testing and other capacities.  
There is evidently much to be gained from 
establishing single "centers of excellence" in 
specialized areas (training, testing of pesticides, 
regional PRAs, etc.), leading to more effective use 
of research capacity, equipment and staff. This also 
applies to the creation of a regional accreditation 
body (in accordance with the EAC SQMT Protocol). 
There is also scope for joint programs in a number 
of fields such as applied research, pilot programs 
(e.g. food safety and backward linkages in tourism 
sector), stakeholder training etc 
- Each country to have a minimum capacity to handle SPS issues, an inventory 
of capacity to be done and program to build capacity 
- identify center of excellence by use of scientific criteria and develop  business 
plans  
- Specify role of centers i.e. to develop analysis methods, rules and guidelines, 
- Establishing a regional accreditation body. Highlight pros and cons of 
establishing a regional body vis a vis a national body specialized organizations 
to member states to get consent. 
 
 
 
Increase collaboration in the National bureaus of standards seem to have put - Implement a traceability system for all products covered under SPS auspices  
  
Title of action Background Specific details to be covered Timeline 
management of 
transboundary risks, notably 
the movement of plant pests 
and animal diseases 
more efforts in the regionalization process than 
other government agencies, research institutes, etc. 
If collaboration occurs, it is often forced by an event 
or a crisis, notably outbreaks of diseases or 
infestation by pests. There is scope to develop a 
variety of regional surveillance and contingency 
planning initiatives to better manage selected 
priority risks. Regional information alert systems and 
joint planning and monitoring would help to prevent 
the spread of pests and diseases through largely 
uncontrolled borders.  
and especially on products of animal origin affected by trans-boundary diseases.  
-  Establish a regional surveillance system for diseases ad undertake a cost 
benefit analysis at national levels for need of this system 
- Coordinate with other institutions in  the region i.e. AU, COMESA to be able to 
use their data 
- Have a SPS committee drawn from national SPS committees.  
- Identify and keep a data base of regional experts/research institutions. 
- Have a coordination mechanism that allows CODEX, IPPC, OIE country 
representations meet and consult 
Finalize the development of 
the EAC SPS Protocol and 
establish joint SPS 
management mechanisms 
The EAC (and COMESA and SADC) trade 
agreement calls upon its members to harmonize 
SPS measures with international standards and to 
seek synergies in building up regional capacities in 
SPS management. Within the EAC, progress on 
SPS has been modest to date - apart from 
interlinked developments in SQMT (Protocol 
adopted 2001). The planned SPS Protocol should 
be finalized and further thought should be given to 
establishing joint management mechanisms and 
developing regional positions (e.g. coordination of 
EAC delegations in Codex, OIE and IPPC sub-
committee meetings, etc.). 
As discussed above  
  
 
Table A1. Sensitive products under the EAC Customs Union 
  
Heading No. Description Duty rate (%) 
   
4.01 Milk/ and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other  
 sweetening matter (of fat content, 1-6% by weight) 60 
4.02 Milk/and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other  
 sweetening matter (in powder, granules or other solid forms) 60 
10.01 Wheat and Meslin  
 Durum wheat 0 
 Other 0 
 Specially prepared for sowing 0 
 Hard wheat 35 
 Other  35 
10.05 Maize (Corn) 50 
10.06 Rice-in the husk (Paddy or rough), husked (brown) rice, semi-milled or  
 wholly milled, broken rice 75 or US $200 per MT 
11.02 Wheat or meslin flour 60 
11.02 Maize (Corn) flour 50 
17.01 Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form  
 (Raw sugar not containing flavouring or colouring matter)  
 cane sugar : juggery 35 
 Other 100 or US $200 per MT whichever is higher 
 Beet sugar : juggery 35 
 Other 100 or US $200 per MT whichever is higher 
 Other containing added flavouring or colouring matter 100 or US $200 per MT whichever is higher 
 Industrial sugar 100 or US $200 per MT whichever is higher 
 Other 100 or US $200 per MT whichever is higher 
   
24.02 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes, of tobacco or of tobacco  
 substitutes 35 
24.03 Other manufactured tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes;  
 "homogenized" or "reconstituted" tobacco; tobacco extracts and essences 35 
  
25.23 Portland cement, aluminous cement, slag cement, supersulphate cement and   
 similar hydraulic cements, whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers 55 
36.05 Matches, other than pyrotechnic articles of heading 36.04 35 
52.08 Woven fabrics of cotton, containing 85% or more by weight of cotton,   
 weighing not more than 200g/m2 (Khanga, Kikoi and Kitenge) 50 
55.13 Woven fabrics of synthetic staple fibres, containing less than 85% by weight  
 of such fibres, mixed mainly or solely with cotton, of a weight not exceeding  
 170g/m2 (including Khanga, Kikoi and Kitenge) 50 
63.02 Bed linen, table linen and kitchen line (including knitted or crocheted, Printed 50 
 bed linen, of cotton and other)  
63.05 Sacks and bags, of kind used for the packing of goods  
 Of jute or other textile bast fibres of heading 53.03 45 
63.09 Worn clothing and other worn articles - US  45% or US cts 45 per bag whichever is higher 
83.09 Stoppers, caps and lids (including crown, screw caps and pouring stoppers), US $ 0.75 per kg or 50% whichever is higher 
 capsules for bottles, threaded bungs, bung covers, seals and other packing  
 accessories of base metals  
 Crown corks 40 
85.06 Primary cells and primary batteries (manganese dioxide, mercuric oxide,  
 silver oxide, Lithium, Air zinc, others) 35 
   
 
Source: *EAC Common External tariff (Annex 1 to the EAC Customs Union Protocol 
 
 
  
 
